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Abstract
This Article proposes to balance the scale by providing principles for the reasonable construction of bad-faith
and unfair claims settlement practices in statutes applicable to insurance. Part I examines the history and
development of bad-faith law, and discusses the common structure of statutes giving rise to badfaith
settlement claims. Part II presents general principles courts may apply to resolve an action alleging bad faith,
and specific principles courts may apply to address common issues with many states’ statutes. Part III then
evaluates the public policy involved in applying such principles to first-party claims where the insured suffers
an injury and seeks compensation directly from the insurance company, or, where they are permitted, third-
party claims where the insured harms a person not party to the insurance contract and the harmed person
makes a claim against the insured who is then defended by the insurer. This Article concludes that the public
interest is most effectively and efficiently served by applying more responsible construction of bad-faith laws
and by returning to the foundational precepts behind these laws. It further reasons that while there is, no
doubt, a substantial public interest in ensuring that insurers “play nicely” and act in good faith, this interest
should not always be enforced through litigation and should never supersede basic fairness and justice.
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Over the past twenty-five years, the law of “bad faith” has grown 
from infancy as a compensable action in contract law into a major 
source of tort litigation.1  During this relatively short gestation period, 
at least in comparison to other legal actions, this new body of tort, 
grounded in an implied contractual or fiduciary duty not to act in 
                                                          
 1. See Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad Faith Laws on 
First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355 (2004) (discussing the 
emergence of an “extracontractual cause of action against insurers for bad-faith 
denial of a claim filed by an insured for benefits allegedly due to the insured under 
the policy”); see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Williams, 936 So. 2d 888, 895 
(Miss. 2006) (“A bad faith insurance claim represents one of the most familiar types 
of punitive damages claims known to our case law.”); Fight Bad-faith Insurance 
Companies (FBIC), http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/ (last visited July 27, 2009) 
(reporting that there are “many hundreds of thousands to a million or more” bad-
faith claimants). 
 
2009] RESTORING THE GOOD FAITH IN BAD FAITH 1479 
bad faith in any dealing, or conversely to act in good faith,2 has 
shifted the balance of power in many transactions.3  As intended, 
plaintiffs’ ability to bring a separate tort action has helped to curb 
abuse and unfair practices.4  Unfortunately, as quickly as bad-faith law 
developed to come to the aid of the disadvantaged party in a contract 
or fiduciary relationship, it has evolved into a litigation quandary that 
often misses its basic purpose.  With every state adopting statutes to 
govern certain types of bad-faith actions,5 litigation of such claims has 
gone beyond simply righting wrongs to become a big business of its 
own.  In some cases, enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys seek out 
technical violations to bring a bad-faith action where there is no 
purposeful or malevolent will, or even a remotely unfair act.6   
In legitimizing such claims, bad-faith law has lost its way.  Today the 
law may actually facilitate bad faith in the very manner in which these 
laws were meant to combat it. 
Principal among laws governing bad faith are those related to 
insurance practices, which are the subject of this Article.  In response 
to alleged insurer abuses, states have, in some form, attempted to 
legislate “bad faith” in the handling of insurance claims practices.7  
Yet, in attempting to define the amorphous concepts of bad faith and 
unfair practices, many states have opened the door to claims that do 
                                                          
 2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (“Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
its enforcement.”). 
 3. See Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 619 (S.C. 1983) 
(arguing that without the availability of such tort claims, insurance companies would 
be able to arbitrarily deny claims without the threat of regulatory enforcement).  
 4. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (describing potentially harmful 
practices insurers were able to engage in due to the limited and proscribed remedies 
available to claimants prior to statutory and judicial reforms). 
 5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-156.5 (LexisNexis 2005) (bad-faith cause of action 
for initiating drug-related claim); ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.390 (2008) (bad-faith cause of 
action relating to workers’ compensation claim); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-17-161 (2004) 
(bad-faith cause of action against consumers making motor vehicle warranty claims); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-430 (2008) (bad-faith cause of action for misreporting child 
abuse); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-33-215 (2006) (bad-faith cause of action for seizing or 
failing to return property in forfeiture); see also, e.g., statutes cited infra note 47. 
 6. The California Supreme Court, a pioneer in bad-faith jurisprudence, see infra 
Part II.A, was among the first to recognize this growing problem:  “It seems . . . that 
attorneys who handle policy claims against insurance companies are no longer 
interested in collecting on those claims, but spend their wits and energies trying to 
maneuver the insurers into committing acts which the insureds can later trot out as 
evidence of bad faith.”  White v. W. Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 328 n.2 (Cal. 1985) 
(Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Neil A. Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be 
Solved:  Are Punitive Damages Awardable in New York for First-Party Bad Faith?,  
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 723, 723 n.1 (1993) (predicting bad faith insurance law “will 
significantly impact the insurance industry in the 1990s”). 
 7. See infra note 47 and accompanying text (illustrating the widespread 
adoption of statutes addressing insurers’ unfair claims settlement practices). 
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not appropriately fit in tort law, but rather should be left to 
traditional contract remedies or state regulatory enforcement.   
The result is that insurers in some states are at risk of being deprived 
of their ability to challenge a reasonably disputed insurance claim.  
Further, they may be unable to make a swift correction of human 
error without facing the prospect of a tort claim, including punitive 
or exemplary damages.8  These damages can toll in the millions of 
dollars for a single claimant’s recovery.9  Such tort claims are also 
increasing in frequency and amount at a time when the regulation of 
insurer practices is at its most comprehensive, leading to an 
incongruity where instead of heightened penalties and regulations 
operating to reduce the incidence of bad-faith claims, more claims 
have been encouraged.10  Without reasonable boundaries in bad-faith 
actions, courts may permit claimants to engage in abusive practices 
against insurers.  This establishes an avenue for windfall recoveries 
for some claimants and offsets the insurance industry’s delicate 
tension between providing recovery and protecting against fraud and 
overpayment—each a cost which is internalized and ultimately borne 
by consumers. 
This issue takes on added urgency now that many states are again 
examining the adoption of bad-faith causes of action against insurers.  
For example, in the past two years, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, 
and Washington have each significantly amended their bad-faith 
laws.11  A number of other states have also considered legislatively 
                                                          
 8. See infra Part II.A.4 (recommending that courts recognize a “right to cure” 
and prohibit the awarding of extra-contractual damages for bad-faith lawsuits in 
order to reduce insurers’ incentives to cover up or contest minor technical errors). 
 9. See, e.g., Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 179 P.3d 645 (Or. 2008) (affirming a 
$20 million punitive damage award for bad-faith insurer practice); see also, e.g., $20 
Million Allstate Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2006, § 2, at 2 ($18 million punitive 
damages verdict against insurer); David Harper, Lawyer:  Suits Not About Big Money, 
TULSA WORLD, Jan. 7, 2007, at A18 ($10 million punitive damages verdict against 
insurer for bad-faith handling of claim); Dan Margolies, A Look At What’s Behind 
Area’s Big Jury Awards, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 16, 2007, at D11 ($10.5 million punitive 
damage award against insurer in first-party bad-faith case). 
 10. See Clausen v. Nat’l Garage Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 140 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1997) (“Actions seeking recovery for bad faith under first-party medical, disability, 
casualty, and life policies are a relatively recent development and an increasingly 
common cause of action.”); see also Alan O. Sykes, Bad Faith Breach of Contract By First-
Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (1996) (explaining the recent rise in bad-
faith insurance actions and the increase in their remedies); supra note 1 and 
accompanying text (emphasizing the rapid increase in bad-faith insurance claims). 
 11. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 10-3-1115 to -1116 (2008)); S.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) 
(codified at MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-1001 (2007)); S.B. 2822, 2008 Leg., 85th Sess. 
(Minn. 2008) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.18 (2008)); S.B. 5726, 2007 Leg.,  
60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2007)). 
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expanding their bad-faith laws.12  While arguments can be made that 
such amendments are not necessary, and that the adaptability of the 
common law is sufficient to protect insureds, the fact remains that 
bad-faith statutes are a reality in our legal system.  As this Article 
demonstrates, often times these statutes and the related common law 
are more than sufficient, to the point of being detrimental to the 
fundamental goal of guaranteeing that insurers do not take 
advantage of their insureds. 
It is in this vein that this Article proposes to balance the scale by 
providing principles for the reasonable construction of bad-faith and 
unfair claims settlement practices in statutes applicable to 
insurance.13  Part I examines the history and development of bad-faith 
law, and discusses the common structure of statutes giving rise to bad-
faith settlement claims.  Part II presents general principles courts may 
apply to resolve an action alleging bad faith, and specific principles 
courts may apply to address common issues with many states’ statutes.  
Part III then evaluates the public policy involved in applying such 
principles to first-party claims where the insured suffers an injury and 
seeks compensation directly from the insurance company, or, where 
they are permitted, third-party claims where the insured harms a 
person not party to the insurance contract and the harmed person 
makes a claim against the insured who is then defended by the 
insurer.14 
This Article concludes that the public interest is most effectively 
and efficiently served by applying more responsible construction of 
bad-faith laws and by returning to the foundational precepts behind 
these laws.  It further reasons that while there is, no doubt, a 
substantial public interest in ensuring that insurers “play nicely” and 
act in good faith, this interest should not always be enforced through 
litigation and should never supersede basic fairness and justice.  
                                                          
12.  In 2009, state jurisdictions introduced the following bad-faith bills:  S.B. 103, 
2009 Leg., 67th Sess. (Colo. 2009); S.B. 763, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009);  
S. 962, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2009); H.B. 450, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009); 
S.B. 1137, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2009); L.D. 1305, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. (Me. 
2009); H.B. 345, 2009 Leg., 61st Sess. (Mont. 2009); S.B. 157, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.M. 2009); A.B. 224, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009); S. 132, 2008–09 Leg., 213th 
Sess. (N.J. 2008); A. 3698, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); H.B. 2791, 2009 Leg., 
Reg. Sess., 75th Sess. (Or. 2009); S.B. 746, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H. 5196, 
2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2009); B. 18-103, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2009). 
 13. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance:  
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 561–82 
(2006) (developing reasonable construction principles in the law of public 
nuisance). 
 14. This Article does not differentiate between first-party and third-party tort 
liability, but rather uses the general term “claimant” to refer to whoever is lawfully 
permitted to bring a claim. 
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Finally, this Article suggests that courts apply the principles discussed 
where a statute does not clearly and unambiguously express a 
contrary interpretation or where doing so would subvert the public’s 
interest in safeguarding consumers from oppressive insurer acts. 
I. LANDSCAPE OF BAD-FAITH CLAIMS 
A. History and Development of Bad Faith   
The history of the law pertaining to bad faith is deeply entwined 
with the practice of insurance.  Nearly a century ago, the New York 
Court of Appeals in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.15 first recognized 
an implied contractual duty of “good faith and fair dealing” in every 
insurance agreement.16  Over a half century later, the Supreme Court 
of California held that “bad” insurer acts provide a basis to look 
beyond the traditional contract measure of damages and create 
common law tort liability.17  Today, this liability is often determined 
by statute and insurance practices continue to dominate the litigation 
landscape.18 
Before courts recognized tort liability for bad faith, and before 
states began to comprehensively regulate insurance practices, 
insurers had greater latitude to act.19  In some instances, insurers, or 
perhaps more appropriately, their employees or agents, took 
advantage of an insured’s lack of remedies to limit, delay, or even 
deny recovery.20  The primary remedy for claims made against an 
insurer during this period was determined by the common law rule of 
Hadley v. Baxendale,21 which limited damages to the terms of a 
                                                          
 15. 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).  
 16. Id. at 624; see also Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 261 (Wis. 1930), 
aff’d on reh’g, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (Wis. 1931) (relying on Brassil and noting that the 
term “bad faith” is one of variable significance and broad application). 
 17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys handling 
insurance policy claims often seek out bad faith to heighten available recoveries).  
 18. See supra note 1 (acknowledging the emergence of bad-faith claims against 
insurance companies). 
 19. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 7.7 (1988) 
(explaining that before the emergence of bad-faith laws, insurers were generally not 
penalized for purposeful delay in paying a claim or a failure to pay); Roger 
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions:  Refining the 
Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 1, 11–12 (1992) (describing insurers’ freedom from liability for legal fees or 
penalties before the enactment of statutes that protected consumers from unjustified 
refusals to pay claims). 
 20. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872) (limiting damages to the 
insurance policy agreement plus interest). 
 21. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).  
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contract.22  Outside of the contract, recovery against an insurer was 
primarily limited to a fraud action, which required a showing that the 
insurer never intended to perform the agreement, or an action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which did not always 
cover economic damages and was not uniformly available across state 
jurisdictions.23  Some states also provided a statutory action to recover 
attorneys’ fees and sometimes penalties or interest for unnecessary 
delays in payment.24  However, the practical difficulties of proving 
fraud, the non-uniform availability of other remedies, and the lack of 
well-developed regulatory oversight or significant penalties for 
insurer violations disadvantaged claimants who challenged a specific 
insurer’s actions. 
Beginning in the 1950s, courts first began to impose an extra-
contractual duty to settle so-called “third-party” claims that arose 
when the insured was sued for wrongfully harming another person.25  
This duty covered situations where an “insurer had rejected a 
settlement offer within the policy limits and the insured thereafter 
incurred liability in excess of those limits,”26 thus leaving the insured 
with the obligation to fund the excess amount owed to the third party 
out-of-pocket.  The Supreme Court of California in Comunale v. 
Traders & General Insurance Co.27 became the first court of last resort 
to hold the insurer, and not the insured, liable for such excess 
damages as a breach of the insurer’s implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.28  As the court explained, “An insurer who denies 
                                                          
 22. See id. at 151 (limiting damages to those contingencies within the mutual 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract). 
 23. See STEPHEN ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS:  LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 2.11, at  
2-32, 2-33 (2d ed. 1997); see also H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California:  Its History, 
Development and Current Status, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 561, 561–63 (1991) (tracing the 
development of tort remedies for bad-faith insurance claims in California); Marc S. 
Mayerson, “First Party” Insurance Bad Faith Claims:  Mooring Procedure to Substance,  
38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 861, 864 (2003) (discussing the elements of fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims that make such claims difficult or 
undesirable to bring). 
 24. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 12 n.39 (listing various state statutes enacted 
at the turn of the century that allowed for recovery of attorneys’ fees and penalties); 
see also id. at 13 (indicating that while some states adopted statutes to allow recovery 
for attorneys’ fees, the majority of states did not adopt similar legislation). 
 25. Browne et al., supra note 1, at 360–81; Dominick C. Capozzola, First-Party Bad 
Faith:  The Search for a Uniform Standard of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181, 185–86 
(2000) (discussing the emergence in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 
328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), of a duty to settle claims in excess of policy limits). 
 26. Sykes, supra note 10, at 406. 
 27. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). 
 28. See id. at 201 (“When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits 
so that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement . . . [the 
insurer’s] unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes a breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
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coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its position may not 
have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it 
is liable for the full amount which will compensate the insured . . . .”29 
In 1973, fifteen years after Comunale, the Supreme Court of 
California once again engineered the development of the law of bad 
faith in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.30 by extending tort liability to 
so-called “first party” claims where an insured sues his or her insurer 
under a liability coverage agreement.31  The court in Gruenberg built 
on third-party jurisprudence32 and a line of California appellate court 
rulings that supported first-party tort liability,33 ultimately reasoning 
that “[t]hese are merely two different aspects of the same duty.”34   
In that case, the “bad faith” was also readily apparent.  The insurer 
“willfully and maliciously” engaged in a scheme to deprive an insured 
of benefits from a fire insurance policy by encouraging criminal 
charges by falsely implying that the insured had a motive to commit 
arson.35  The insured was unable to appear for an examination while 
the criminal charges were pending, and the insurer intended to use 
the insured’s failure to appear as a pretense for denying liability.36 
                                                          
 29. Id. at 202. 
 30. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
 31. See id. at 1037 (holding that an insurer may be liable in tort for failing to 
compensate insured). 
 32. See, e.g., Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201 (distinguishing insurance companies’ duty 
to compensate third parties (which is limited to the policy amount) from insurance 
companies’ duty to insureds (first parties) for insurance company breach of 
contract); see also, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (affirming 
judgment of emotional damages for third-party plaintiff against insurer). 
 33. The California Court of Appeal case, Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co., 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1968), aff’d 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Ct. App. 1971), appears to be the 
first to permit extra-contractual damages in the first-party insurance context.  See id. 
at 767 (insured under disability policy awarded $500,000 punitive damages and 
$1,050 compensatory damages relating to claim for $150 in monthly benefits).   
Two years later, the Court of Appeal affirmed after remittitur, punitive and 
compensatory damages for an insurer’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
resulting from the insurer’s wrongful refusal to pay the insured’s disability claim, and 
stated that independent of that tort, the threatened and actual bad faith acts 
constituted a “tortious interference to a protected property interest.”  Fletcher v. 
Western Nat’l Life Ins. Corp., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).  In 1972, the court 
similarly relied upon this theory to justify a punitive damage award in an uninsured 
motorist case.  See Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 
(Ct. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds by Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1042 n.10; see also 
Kelly H. Thompson, Comment, Bad Faith:  Limiting Insurers’ Extra-Contractual Liability 
in Texas, 41 SW. L.J. 719, 719 (1987) (“California pioneered the development of 
insurers’ extra-contractual liability . . . .”). 
 34. Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1037. 
 35. See id. at 1038 (noting that the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired 
to encourage criminal charges against the plaintiff by wrongly implying that the 
plaintiff had a motive to commit arson). 
 36. Id. at 1038. 
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Following the Comunale and Gruenberg decisions, courts in other 
states applied similar reasoning to recognize tort liability for bad faith 
in both first-party and third-party claims.37  Because these seminal 
decisions involved different types of “bad” acts—a manifestly unfair 
act in Comunale and an intentional act in Gruenberg—and because the 
court in Gruenberg did not expressly state that intent was required, 
courts struggled with the degree of culpability needed to maintain 
this newly established tort.38  In 1978, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.39 provided a more definitive 
and widely-accepted standard that there must be “an absence of a 
reasonable basis for denial of policy benefits and the knowledge or 
reckless disregard of a reasonable basis for a denial.”40  The court 
further explained that “the tort of bad faith is not a tortious breach of 
contract.  It is a separate intentional wrong, which results from a 
breach of duty imposed as a consequence of the relationship 
established by contract.”41  The court also recognized that the absence 
of an intent element would allow claimants to “scar[e] insurers into 
paying questionable claims because of the threat of a bad faith suit.”42  
As the common law basis for the tort of bad faith solidified and, in 
the case of first-party claims, was adopted by a majority of states in the 
                                                          
 37. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156 n.6 
(Alaska 1989) (allowing an action in tort for breach of good faith and fair dealing in 
insurance contracts due to the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); 
Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981) (refusing to allow 
insurers to deny claims in bad faith, where insurers know “that the avowed purpose 
of the insurance contract [i]s to protect the insured at his weakest and most perilous 
time of need”).  A number of states that expressly rejected a common law cause of 
action for bad faith in first-party claims permit third-party actions.  See, e.g., Johnson 
v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536 A.2d 1211, 1212–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Duncan 
v. Andrew County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13, 18–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lawton 
v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). 
 38. The Gruenberg decision did not explicitly state that a willful or malicious act 
was necessary to maintain a first-party bad-faith claim in tort.  Rather, the court only 
required an unreasonable act.  See Jason C. Brown, Extra-Contractual Damages Stemming 
from a First-Party Insurer’s Bad Faith Breach:  Will Minnesota Adopt the Tort or Contract 
Theory of Recovery?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 525, 534 (2000) (noting a consensus by 
scholars that Gruenburg’s holding is vague and gives little guidance). 
 39. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). 
 40. Id. at 377 (emphasis in original); cf. Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (articulating the same reasonable basis and actual 
knowledge standard).  But see Lee Shidlofsky, The Changing Face of First-Party Bad Faith 
Claims in Texas, 50 SMU L. REV. 867, 872 (1997) (discussing the weaknesses of the test 
announced in Arnold). 
 41. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 374; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 
477 So. 2d 242, 250 (Miss. 1985) (stressing that a bad-faith refusal claim is an 
“independent tort”). 
 42. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377 (quoting John W. Thornton & Milton S. Blaut, 
Bad Faith and Insurers:  Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 12 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. 
L.J. 699, 719 (1977)).  
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1970s and 1980s,43 many states also moved towards statutory 
codification.44  State legislatures often set out to protect against 
insurer bad faith by enumerating unfair practices or, at least, by 
providing plaintiffs with a statutory bad-faith comparison when 
initiating a common law action.45  The law of bad faith began to 
follow an unsteady and precarious path during this period.46  
Although the state legislatures enacted statutes in an attempt to instill 
greater definition and support to bad-faith law, some statutes have 
blunted the willfulness, maliciousness, or manifest injustice that 
provided the foundation of this new tort action in the first place.   
The idea of inherent unfairness of specific acts has been lost in 
certain instances and, instead, has been replaced with nebulous 
elements that have been manipulated to enhance outcomes. 
                                                          
 43. State supreme court decisions expanding bad-faith tort actions to first-party 
claimants during this period include:  Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 
2d 1 (Ala. 1981); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 
1989); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985); Buckman v. People Express, 
Inc., 530 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1987); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 
(Idaho 1986); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1988); Curry v. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1989); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simpson, 477 
So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1985); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1982); 
Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991); United Fire Ins. Co. v. 
McClelland, 780 P.2d 193 (Nev. 1989); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 527 P.2d 
798 (N.M. 1974); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 
N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 
1983); Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Bibeault v. 
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
306 S.E.2d 616 (S.C. 1983); Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 399 N.W.2d 320 (S.D. 
1987); Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); and 
Anderson v. Cont. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).  States continued to 
recognize first-party bad-faith suits into the 1990s.  See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 
P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993); Marquis 
v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993); McCullough v. Golden Rule 
Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990).  See generally Browne et al., supra note 1, at 355; 
Capozzola, supra note 25, at 182; Goldberg et al., supra note 6, at 727; A.S. Klein, 
Annotation, Insurer’s Liability for Consequential or Punitive Damages for Wrongful Delay or 
Refusal to Make Payments Due Under Contracts, 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1992).   
 44. See Mayerson, supra note 22, at 863 n.6 (2003) (discussing state level, non-
judicially promulgated standards and rules for insurance company conduct). 
 45. See infra notes 120–121 (exploring the influence of statutes in adjudication 
and on the common law). 
 46. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 32 (arguing that while “the new tort remedy 
[is] necessary in some form, [it] now shows signs of being too oppressive on an 
industry whose financial vitality and efficiency are essential to social well-being”). 
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B. Bad-Faith Statutes 
Today, statutes addressing bad-faith and unfair insurance claims 
settlement practices exist, in some form, in every state.47  These laws 
are largely a product of model legislation drafted by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the early 1970s.48  
The NAIC’s model legislation covered unfair methods of competition 
and general deceptive practices in the insurance business.49   
                                                          
 47. See ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (LexisNexis 2007); ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (2008); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-461 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206 (2001); CAL. INS. 
CODE § 790.03(h) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(h), 10-3-1115  
to -1116 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38A-816(6) (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 2304(16) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.155(1) (West 2004), 626.9541(1)(i) (West 
2009), 766.1185 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-34 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 431:13-103(a) (LexisNexis 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1329 (2003); 215 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/154.6, 5/155 (West 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4.5 
(LexisNexis 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4(9) (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 40-2404(9) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230 (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 22:1220, 22:1973 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2164-D, 2436-A (2000); 
MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-303 to -305, 27-1001 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
93A, § 9, ch. 176D, § 3 (LexisNexis 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2026 
(LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20(12), 72A.201, 604.18; MO. REV. STAT.  
§ 375.1007 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-201, 33-18-242 (2007); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 44-1540 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.310 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 417:4(XV) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN.  
§ 59A-16-20 (LexisNexis 2000); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (McKinney Supp. 2009); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 58-63-15(11), 75-1.1 to -16 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-03(9) 
(2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21(P) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 36, § 1250.4–.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.230 (2007); 
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1171.5(a)(10) (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (West 2007); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-33 (1997), 27-9.1-4 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-20 (2002); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109, 56-7-105, 56-8-
104(8) (2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.003 (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN.  
§ 31A-26-303 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(9) (2) (2005); VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 38.2-510 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.015 (Supp. 2009); WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 284-30-330 (2009); W. VA. CODE R. ANN. §§ 33-11-4(9), 33-11-4a (2006); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 26-13-124 (2007).  Mississippi and Wisconsin do not appear to have 
statutes specific to insurance bad-faith or unfair claims settlement practices, but do 
generally prohibit unfair or deceptive insurance practices and set forth time periods 
in which claims must be paid.  See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 83-5-33, -45, 83-9-5 (1999 & 
Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 424.501, 628.46 (West 2004 & 2005).  But see 
Kontowicz v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 714 N.W.2d 105, 115 (Wis. 2006) (stating that 
the statute relating to the timely payment of insurance claims was unrelated to the 
tort action of bad faith). 
 48. NAIC originally promulgated the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act 
(MUTPA) in the 1950s with provisions for the regulation of insurer unfair trade 
practices, and all states had adopted it by 1959.  See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19,  
§ 8.1, at 932–34; Henderson, supra note 19, at 14.  However, the original model act 
mainly dealt with the marketing practices of insurers.  New model legislation dealing 
with unfair claims settlement practices was developed and incorporated into the 
MUTPA by amendment in 1972.  Proceedings of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners 495 (1972) [hereinafter Proceedings]. 
 49. Proceedings, supra note 49, at 495–96. 
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In tailoring statutes specific to claims settlement practices, a majority 
of states have adopted this legislation with only minor changes.50   
The core provisions of such statutes are general and justifiably 
broad in scope.  For example, there is a near uniform provision that 
requires insurers to communicate “reasonably promptly” with respect 
to claims, and the requirement to adopt and implement “reasonable 
standards” for claims investigation.51  This requirement is often 
supplemented by an obligation to affirm or deny a claim within a 
“reasonable time.”52  These statutes typically contain a prohibition 
against refusing to pay claims without a “reasonable investigation,” 
and the essential duty to negotiate “in good faith to effectuate 
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has 
become reasonably clear.”53  Many statutes also contain provisions 
prohibiting insurers from “[c]ompelling insureds to institute 
litigation . . . by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered” when an insured makes a claim.54 
In essence, these general provisions cover insurer actions that are 
unreasonable, but not necessarily intentional.  They are included 
among more specific prohibited acts that imply an element of intent.  
For example, most unfair claims settlement statutes also prohibit 
insurers from:  attempting to settle claims where the insurer altered a 
claims application without notice or consent of the insured; making 
payments to insureds or beneficiaries without stating the coverage 
under which the payments were being made; delaying investigation 
or payment of a claim by requiring submission of preliminary claims 
                                                          
 50. The states adopting NAIC’s model legislation near wholesale include:  Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.   
See, e.g., Knotts v. Zurich Ins. Co., 197 S.W.3d 512, 528 (Ky. 2006) (stating that 
Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act was enacted almost verbatim from 
the NAIC model act and that the act has been adopted in varying forms in all fifty 
states and U.S. territories).  Other states have adopted nearly identical language for 
less substantial portions of their unfair claims settlement statutes.  These states 
include Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah.   
See, e.g., Lewis v. Equity Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183 (Miss. 1994) (stating that 
Mississippi’s unfair claims settlement act was based from model NAIC legislation 
drafted in 1976). 
 51. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1329 (2003) (adopting the model legislation 
without significant modification or additional claims settlement provisions). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.4 (arguing that claims settlement statutes that 
compare the insurer’s final settlement offer to the amount recovered represent 
unsound policy). 
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reports with duplicative information; and intimidating claimants by 
making them aware of an insurer’s policy of appealing any arbitration 
award favorable to the insured.55   
Despite the commonality in structure and language of most of the 
unfair claims settlement practices state statutes, judicial 
interpretation of these laws varies significantly.  The combination of 
unreasonable insurer acts and intentional acts within the statutes 
provides some explanation for divergent interpretations.  Because 
these statutes are largely based on model legislation that predates the 
prevailing common law developments with respect to the degree of 
culpability necessary to maintain an action,56 the statutes fail to clearly 
identify bad-faith settlement practices as an intentional tortious act.  
Thus, less culpable conduct, including that of mere negligence, may 
trigger a statutory bad-faith violation even where it would be 
inappropriate under the state’s common law.57  Such amorphous and 
inconsistent treatment has encouraged allegations of bad faith in 
insurance litigation, even in cases where the insurer and the insured 
simply disagree, or for other non-negligent conduct. 
Inconsistent state interpretations also exist as to the manner of 
enforcement—specifically, whether private or public actors should 
enforce bad-faith statutes.  Some states have codified the common law 
bad-faith cause of action expressly and thereby allow private 
enforcement,58 while other states expressly retain exclusive oversight 
                                                          
 55. See statutes cited supra note 47. 
 56. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (tracing the development of the 
level of culpability required in a bad faith tort claim).  
 57. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1113 (2008) (stating a negligence 
standard for first-party claims against an insurer), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 
P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985) (articulating a two-element standard for insurer 
conduct:  “unreasonable conduct, and knowledge that the conduct is unreasonable 
or a reckless disregard for the fact that the conduct is unreasonable”). 
 58. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1113 (2008) (explaining that an insurer 
has breached its duty of good faith if it has unreasonably delayed or denied payment, 
and providing guidelines for civil actions based on such a breach); FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 624.155(1) (West 2004) (allowing any person damaged to bring a civil action 
against an insurer); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-7 (West 2000) (permitting a claimant to 
initiate a civil action based on bad faith only after the claimant has attempted to 
settle with the insurer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (2008) (listing several specific 
acts that constitute a breach of the insurer’s duty of good faith when knowingly 
committed); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (West 2007) (explaining the various 
remedies available under a private bad-faith cause of action against an insurer);  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (2005) (allowing a claimant to recover compensatory and 
punitive damages, as well as attorneys’ fees, against an insurer that refuses to pay or 
settle a claim in bad faith); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.30.015 (2007) (requiring an 
unreasonable denial of benefits by an insurer before a claimant may bring a private 
action); see also Goldberg et al., supra note 6, at 731 (noting that many of these 
statutes serve as the legislatures’ response to a state judicial branch not recognizing a 
common law claim against insurers for bad faith).  
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and enforcement through the state insurance commissioner.59   
In some states, the judiciary has also created an implied private right 
of action on the basis of a bad-faith statute.60  Other state courts have 
taken the opposite approach and have held that bad-faith statutes 
preempt private enforcement.61  Even where a private statutory right 
                                                          
 59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-461(19)(D) (West Supp. 2004) (noting 
that although the unfair claims settlement practices statute provides a right to an 
administrative remedy, it does not provide any private right of action for insureds); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2164-D(8) (2000) (noting that the state’s unfair 
claims practices section may not be construed to provide a private cause of action); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-69 (2005) (barring private actions under the state’s 
unfair or deceptive insurance practices laws); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-101 (2008) 
(granting the state insurance commissioner sole enforcement authority for, and 
barring any private right of action under, the Tennessee Unfair Trade Practices and 
Unfair Claims Settlement Act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-26-303 (2005) (listing what 
acts constitute unfair claims settlement practices, but explicitly barring a private 
cause of action based on such acts). 
 60. See Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994) (implying a 
private right of action for violation of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act in cases 
where the insurer’s action rises to the level of a general business practice); Curry v. 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1989) (implying a right of action 
for first-party claimants based, in part, on a public policy argument for the 
advantages of permitting recovery when an insurer acts in bad faith); State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 117–18 (Ky. 1988) (reasoning that a 
third-party private right of action was permissible, because the insurer had clearly 
violated the Unfair Claims Settlement Practice Act and the Act did not specifically 
prohibit such a claim); Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 365 N.E.2d 802, 805 
(Mass. 1977) (holding that the legislature’s failure to specifically provide for a private 
right of action under the state consumer protection act does not demonstrate an 
intent to prohibit such a claim), superseded by statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(1) 
(2002), as recognized in Hershenow v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 840 N.E.2d 526, 532 
(Mass. 2006); Indus. Indem. Co. of N.W. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 530 (Wash. 1990) 
(finding that the plain language of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act 
supported an insured’s private bad-faith cause of action against an insurer).  In Royal 
Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1979), the California 
Supreme Court was the first to hold that a private cause of action existed for a 
violation under its version of the model NAIC legislation, but reversed itself almost a 
decade later.   See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 68  
(Cal. 1988) (arguing that the Royal Globe decision was based primarily on public 
policy, and that resolutions based on competing policy issues are more properly 
addressed by the legislature).  West Virginia also initially implied a private right of 
action in Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981), 
but later enacted legislation superseding the decision.  See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-
4a (LexisNexis 2006) (abrogating a private cause of action relating to bad-faith 
settlements of insurance claims).  Conversely, in Montana, an implied right of action 
was superseded by a statute that allowed private enforcement.  See Klaudt v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Mont. 1983) (finding that the 
statutory language on its face clearly protected third-party claims), superseded by 
statute, Unfair Trade Practices Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2007), as recognized 
in O’Fallon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 859 P.2d 1008, 1014–15 (Mont. 1993) (noting that 
the new law was more permissive because, to allow for a private right of action, it did 
not require violations of the code to be so frequent as to rise to a general business 
practice).  
 61. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 158 (Kan. 1980) 
(finding that the legislature provided multiple detailed alternative remedies, 
including those related to bad faith on the part of insurer, for a wronged insured); 
Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581 (N.H. 1978) (noting that the 
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of action is recognized, a number of state courts have found that this 
action is only available to those insured and not other third-party 
claimants.62  Further, in those states where no private statutory right 
of action exists, some courts have nevertheless found that unfair 
claims settlement statutes were useful proxies for identifying 
instances of bad faith in private actions brought under the common 
law.63 
In addition to state-by-state differences as to who may bring a 
statutory bad-faith action against an insurer, there is significant 
variation in what a successful plaintiff may recover.  Some claims 
settlement statutes specifically provide for attorneys’ fees or they set 
forth damage ranges for each violation of the statute.64  For example, 
Oklahoma imposes a fine, enforced by the state Insurance 
Commissioner, between $100 and $5,000 for each violation of its 
                                                          
legislature established alternative mechanisms to handle insurer malfeasance); 
D’Ambrosio v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981) 
(reasoning that allowing a private cause of action in addition to the enforcement 
mechanisms available to the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner would require 
the court to improperly delve into policy issues), superseded by statute, 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 8371 (2007); cf. Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1020  
(Or. 1978) (explaining that although the need for private enforcement based on bad 
faith might arise in extraordinary circumstances, traditional contract remedies are 
almost always adequate for insurance cases). 
 62. See, e.g., Bates v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Iowa 1991) 
(arguing that the adversarial nature of the relationship between the insurer and a 
third-party claimant, unlike the fiduciary relationship between an insurer and the 
insured does not provide a basis for a good-faith duty to settle a claim); Dvorak v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1993) (explaining that an 
insurer’s duty to settle in good-faith extends only to insureds, because, unlike third 
parties, insureds are direct beneficiaries of the insurer’s actions); Kallevig, 792 P.2d at 
528–30 (holding that the statutory language provides a private right of action for 
first-party claimants only); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 
265 (Wis. 1981) (arguing that a bad-faith tort claim, while distinct from a breach of 
contract claim, still arises from the insurance contract and therefore only extends to 
the insured). 
 63. See, e.g., Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 
(D. Haw. 1998) (stating that although no private right of action exists under Hawaii’s 
unfair claims settlement statute, it may nevertheless be used as evidence of insurer 
bad faith in a common law action); see also Kontowicz v. Am. Standards, Inc.,  
714 N.W.2d 105, 114–15 (Wis. 2006) (supporting an unfair claims settlement, in part, 
with broad statutory principles from case law on bad-faith tort claims). 
 64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(4) (West 2004) (allowing a successful 
plaintiff to recover damages, court costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 33-4-6 (2000) (granting the insured limited damages in addition to attorneys’ 
fees and court costs); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/155 (West 1993 & Supp. 2009) 
(capping the damages available to the insured at sixty percent of the damages, sixty 
thousands dollars, and/or the excess of the determined damages, not including 
costs, minus any settlement offered by the insurer); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,  
§ 2436-A(1) (allowing a recovery scheme similar to that in Florida, but also providing 
a monthly interest rate of 1.5 percent on damages).  
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statute,65 while Nebraska imposes a penalty up to $30,000 for each 
and every violation.66  A number of states also allow punitive damages 
for private claimants.67  Massachusetts’s bad-faith statute, for instance, 
expressly permits punitive damages up to twenty-five percent of the 
underlying bad-faith claim.68  In comparison, Louisiana uses a 
                                                          
 65. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1250.14 (West 1994) (exempting the State 
Insurance Fund). 
 66. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1543 (2004) (capping the total penalty, however, at 
$150,000). 
 67. See, e.g., Craft v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 574 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(permitting punitive damages in insurance bad-faith claims based on a public 
interest in preventing insurance companies from abusing their insureds); Trimper v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (D. S.C. 1982) (arguing that not 
allowing punitive damages for bad-faith tort actions would allow insurance 
companies to operate with impunity); Rodgers v. Penn. Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 
879, 884 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (explaining that a prima facie case for the recovery of 
punitive damages requires the insured to allege that the insurer acted recklessly and 
maliciously in denying benefits); German v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 51, 53 
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (noting that the law does not favor punitive damages); Escambia 
Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1370–71 (N.D. Fla. 1976) 
(cautioning that punitive damages are only justified when the defendant is guilty of 
oppression, fraud, or malice); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (rejecting arguments that punitive damages are improper and 
impermissible compensation for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Grand 
Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1977) (adopting the Gruenberg rule which states that insurers have a good faith duty 
to fairly handle claims made by insurers, and that a violation of this duty gives rise to 
an action in tort); Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 368 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1982) (recognizing a developing trend allowing for recovery of punitive damages 
against insurers for breach of contract rising to the level of willful, wanton, 
fraudulent, or malicious conduct); Penn. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 264 S.E.2d 
483, 485–86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining that punitive damages should be 
affirmed unless there was a reasonable legal defense discharging the insurer from its 
duty of good faith); Linscott v. Rainier Nat’l Life Ins. Co. 606 P.2d 958, 964 (Idaho 
1980) (holding that, to receive punitive damages, a plaintiff must show that the 
insurer’s handling of the claim deviated from reasonable standards of conduct with 
an awareness of the consequences of that deviation); Sacton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. 
Co., 337 N.E.2d 527, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that punitive damages are 
appropriate when an insurer heedlessly disregards the consequences of its actions 
and acts fraudulently or oppressively); First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 
1049 (Mont. 1979) (allowing an insured to recover punitive damages based on actual 
or presumed fraud or malice); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire 
Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 646 (N.D. 1979) (noting that California and North Dakota 
statutes require that the insured show that “the insurer acted ‘with the intent to vex, 
injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights’” in order to 
recover punitive damages (quoting Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 
(Cal. 1974)); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (Ohio 1983) 
(arguing that mere inaction on behalf of the insurer is not enough to allow an 
insured to recover punitive damages); Christian v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 
899, 903 (Okla. 1977); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980); 
Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 620 (S.C. 1983) 
(explaining that with the recognition of the bad-faith cause of action as a tort, 
punitive damages may be allowable). 
 68. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176D, § 7 (2002) (allowing, in addition, non-
monetary damages, such as revocation of license for repeat offenders); see also MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2002) (allowing punitive damages for a bad-faith action 
between two and three times the actual damages). 
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multiplier and allows exemplary damages up to two times any 
compensatory recovery.69   
States that recently amended their bad-faith statutes have also 
significantly heightened available extra-contractual damages.   
For example, since 2007, Maryland has increased penalties up to 
$125,000 per insurer violation,70 Colorado has authorized aggregate 
penalties up to $750,000,71 and Washington has enacted a treble 
damages multiplier for first-party insurance bad-faith claims.72   
A final differentiating quality in many claims settlement statutes is 
the inclusion of additional prohibited acts that are not part of the 
model NAIC legislation.  These provisions often include rigid criteria, 
such as specific time limits within which an insurer must process a 
claim, and provide a basis for much of the bad-faith litigation 
involving less culpable insurers.  For example, states like Missouri, 
Nebraska, and Illinois have statutes prescribing a strict fifteen-day 
window in which the insurer must provide claims forms or violate the 
state’s unfair claims settlement act.73  In Rhode Island, that period is 
ten days.74  Some states also set strict deadlines for other practices, 
                                                          
 69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973(C) (2008) (adding that insurers are not 
permitted to use any punitive damages for setting rates or market-rate filings). 
 70. See S.B. 389, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (codified at MD. CODE ANN. INS. 
§ 27-1001 (2007)) (authorizing the state commissioner to impose consequential 
damages under the bad-faith statute). 
 71. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 10-3-1115 to -1116 (2008)) (providing that the $750,000 cap is the annual 
limit for aggregate penalties, and further limiting the penalty for a single violation to 
$3,000). 
 72. See S.B. 5726, 2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 48.30.015 (2007)) (noting that the insured may apply other claims against 
the insurer based on unfair or deceptive practices, which are not subject to the bill’s 
limits). 
 73. See 215 ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5/154.6(o) (West 2003) (listing various acts 
which, if committed knowingly, will constitute improper claims practice); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 375.1007(13) (2002) (requiring further that the insurer include reasonable 
instructions for the forms’ use); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1540(14) (2004) (standing 
alone as the only provision in the section with a specific time limit despite an overall 
focus on promptness). 
 74. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(13) (2008). 
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such as when an insurer must respond to a claim75 or even when a 
claim must be settled.76 
Differences in identification of bad-faith conduct, enforcement 
mechanisms, and remedies create a wide range of treatment for bad 
faith in the handling of insurance claims.  Although most states’ 
statutes appear similar, and sometimes nearly identical in form, their 
interpretation by courts and the presence of additional provisions or 
remedies creates close to fifty unique landscapes.  It is against this 
backdrop that courts would benefit from a more reasoned set of 
principles to apply in addressing bad-faith insurance claims. 
II. APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON FOR 
 JUST CONSTRUCTION OF BAD-FAITH LAWS 
In delineating principles to assist courts with bad-faith insurance 
claims, we begin with the most basic inquiry:  What is bad faith?  
Courts and legal scholars have long struggled to form an acceptable 
answer to this question.77  The difficulty of reaching a satisfactory 
definition stems in part from the fact that good faith and bad faith 
have only recently been independently recognized in tort law.78   
In many respects, bad-faith law is still in its formative years.  Rather 
than attempt to precisely define bad faith, many states, at common 
law, adopt a “you know it when you see it” approach and leave it for a 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(e) (West 2004) (requiring an 
insurer to affirm or deny claims, or communicate that claims are being investigated 
upon an insured’s written request within thirty days after completing proof of loss 
statements); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 1250.4(C) (1994) (providing that an insurer must 
respond to all pertinent written communications from the insured within thirty days 
after receipt); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(16) (2008) (allowing the insurer to take 
longer with the consent of the insured); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67(1) (2005) 
(instructing the insurer to adopt standards to promote prompt investigation of 
claims in addition to the thirty-day response to a claim requirement). 
 76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(15)(B) (2007) (requiring an insurer to 
settle claims within forty-five days); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20(F) (West 2008) 
(characterizing the failure to settle “catastrophic claims” within ninety days as a 
prohibited unfair claims practice); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(o) (2006) (requiring 
claims to be settled within a ninety-day period). 
 77. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 34 (“The term ‘bad faith’ . . . is not self-
defining, nor has it historically been a recognized, independent basis of culpability in 
tort law.  It has come to mean different things to different courts.  Consequently, its 
use has caused definitional problems from the outset.”); see also King v. Second Nat’l 
Bank & Trust of Saginaw, Mich., 173 So. 498, 500 (Ala. 1937) (“Bad faith is not to be 
inferred from facts equally consistent with good faith.”); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980) (describing, critically, the trend towards 
recognition of the independent tort of bad faith as an attempt to provide a remedy 
for every wrong). 
 78. See supra Part II.A (highlighting the development of the independent tort of 
bad faith and concluding that attempts to statutorily define bad faith have only 
muddled its meaning). 
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jury to filter out what bad faith really means.79  Because this practice 
can lead to inconsistent results, states have moved to codify bad faith 
through laws such as insurance claims settlement statutes, and, in 
doing so, have re-encountered the same difficulties and 
inconsistencies that initially prompted courts to resist more rigid 
definitions for this highly amorphous concept.80  The effect of this 
dual statutory and common law development is that the law of bad 
faith is now more muddled than ever.  To help wade through this 
disorder and provide rational boundaries for bad faith, this Article 
proposes a set of general principles applicable to all types of bad-faith 
insurance claims along with a set of principles applicable to common 
issues arising under claims settlement statutes. 
A. General Principles Applicable to Bad-Faith Claims 
1. “Bad Faith” should include a minimum element of intentional or reckless 
misconduct 
The law of bad faith originated in order to combat the “bad acts” of 
insurers.81  It was first recognized to prevent insurers from refusing to 
settle a claim or properly defend an insured against third parties and 
instead roll the dice at the insured’s expense in hopes of being found 
liable for less than the insured’s policy limit.82  The tort was later 
recognized in a case involving acts tantamount to fraud where an 
insurer “willfully and maliciously” schemed to deny coverage to the 
insured.83  These origins, whether or not formally expressed at the 
time, were aimed at countering specific and purposeful insurer acts.84  
They invoked a sense of dishonesty and malice on the part of an 
                                                          
 79. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1996) 
(explaining that good faith and bad faith have “no universally accepted definition” 
and, therefore, the trier of fact has “considerable flexibility” in adjudicating cases 
involving potential mishandling of insurance claims). 
 80. See Capozzola, supra note 25, at 182–83 (explaining that attempts to provide a 
remedy for bad faith have led to insurer culpability standards that vary widely from 
state to state). 
 81. See supra Part I.A (describing how insurers historically could sometimes take 
advantage of the fact that insureds were only permitted to recover up to the amount 
of their policy). 
 82. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text (explaining that the initial 
reasoning behind allowing third-party claims was that the insured should not suffer 
as a result of the insurer’s unreasonable actions).  
 83. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (discussing Gruenberg v. Aetna 
Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973), which involved an insurer that encouraged 
criminal charges against the insured in order to deny liability). 
 84. See Leland C. Smith, II, Tort Liability for an Insurer’s Bad Faith Refusal to Settle:   
A Developing Trend Appropriate for Adoption in Missouri, 45 MO. L. REV. 103, 106–08 
(1980) (discussing the development of bad-faith tort action in California to prevent 
an insurer from blatantly disregarding the best interest of the insured). 
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insurer; sentiments with which other courts could empathize and 
quickly justify an entirely new addition to their common law.85 
A majority of jurisdictions now agree that bad faith requires an 
element of intent or reckless disregard;86 however, this must be 
clarified.  These courts have largely aligned with the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Anderson v. Continental Insurance 
Co.,87 which established a more measured approach that considers the 
interests of both claimants and insurers.88  Other courts, like the 
Supreme Court of California, have disagreed with this view, holding 
that mere negligence satisfies bad faith.89  In states like Mississippi 
and New Mexico, the bad-faith standard is gross negligence.90   
Until significant legislative reforms in 2005, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals had taken the most maverick approach, 
finding it “of little importance whether an insurer contests an 
insured’s claim in good or bad faith,” and holding that insurers could 
                                                          
 85. See Capozzola, supra note 25, at 188 (explaining that the most common 
argument for the availability of a bad-faith tort action is based on the fear that an 
insurer would otherwise act with impunity and deny claims when it benefits from 
doing so). 
 86. See James A. McGuire & Kristin Dodge McMahon, Issues for Excess Insurer 
Counsel in Bad Faith and Excess Liability Cases, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 337, 339 (1995) 
(stating that a majority of jurisdictions require more than negligence, but less than 
the standard for fraud, to maintain a bad-faith cause of action). 
 87. 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). 
 88. See id. at 378 (holding that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress 
caused by an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay a claim when the emotional distress is 
severe and the plaintiff has also suffered other substantial damages); Roger C. 
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two Decades, 
37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153, 1158–59 (1995) (noting that in 1995 at least ten of thirty 
jurisdictions followed the Wisconsin test, while others have taken the test a step 
further by requiring “gross negligence”); see also Capozzola, supra note 25, at 203–05 
(proposing a bifurcated standard of negligence for actual damages, and an 
intentional or reckless disregard standard for punitive damages); McGuire & 
McMahon, supra note 86, at 339 (discussing how the Michigan judiciary identified 
factors—e.g., failing to inform the insured of developments, rejecting a reasonable 
offer of settlement, and disregarding legal advice—to aid in determining whether an 
insurer has acted in bad faith). 
 89. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 173 (Cal. 1967) 
(discussing the tort of bad-faith in the context of tort claims generally, and 
explaining that damages are appropriate when a plaintiff is injured as a result of a 
defendant’s negligent conduct).  But see Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prod. Sales & 
Mrkt., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (signaling a possible trend of 
courts moving away from the mere negligence standard by requiring that bad faith 
“rise to the level of unfair dealing”). 
 90. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1986) (holding 
that in order for an insured to receive damages above the amount of the policy, he 
or she must prove gross negligence on the part of the insurer); Jessen v. Nat’l Excess 
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1247 (N.M. 1989) (stating that based on a theory of either 
contract or tort, punitive damages are justified when an insurer acts with gross 
negligence); see also Henderson, supra note 88, at 1158 n.44 (explaining that gross 
negligence is a somewhat ambiguous term, but is generally considered more 
outrageous than ordinary negligence). 
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be held liable for consequential damages even for reasonable claim 
denials.91 
By recognizing bad faith in the absence of an intentional act by the 
insurer, courts risk severely undermining the substance of this law.  
They expand the scope and boundaries of bad faith to encompass 
well-intentioned actions by insurers and they muddy the law’s goal of 
giving notice of the type of conduct that will result in liability.92  If bad 
faith comes to mean everything, then it will soon mean nothing.  
Therefore, to give any substantive meaning to a cause of action for 
bad faith, and to separate it from ordinary actions based in 
negligence, an element of intent must be present.93  The concept of 
“negligence” can work well in measuring conduct that may threaten a 
physical harm such as negligent driving; however, it does not work 
well as a measure of conduct when an insurer, acting on a contract, 
makes a good-faith decision not to settle a case.   
Courts such as the Arkansas Supreme Court have given meaningful 
substance to bad faith, reasoning that an insurer must have acted in a 
“dishonest, malicious, or oppressive” manner in delaying or denying 
an insured’s claim.94  In an attempt to maintain the integrity of bad-
faith actions, the Supreme Court of Alabama imposed a “directed 
verdict” rule that requires the policyholder to be entitled to a 
directed verdict on its coverage claim in order for the insurance 
                                                          
 91. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 79 (W. Va. 1986).  
West Virginia’s reform legislation, in part, abolished third-party insurance bad-faith 
claims, which is estimated to have saved the state’s residents over $80 million since its 
enactment.  See S.B. 418, 2005 Leg. (W. Va. 2005) (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 33-11-4a (LexisNexis 2008)) (noting the bill’s aim is to establish prerequisites to 
filing third-party bad-faith claims); see also Jake Stump, Officials Say Ban on Bad Faith 
Suits Benefits Consumers, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 7, 2008, at 2A (noting the new 
system in place requires third parties to handle claims through the State 
Commissioner).  In addition to eliminating third-party claims, the 2005 amendments 
to the state’s bad-faith laws imposed an intentional tort standard for certain penalties 
issued by the state insurance regulators.  See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-4a, 33-11-6 
(LexisNexis 2006) (omitting a requirement that the insurer’s action must rise to a 
general business practice if the insurer intentionally acts in bad faith). 
 92. See supra notes 79–80 (discussing how the current law’s ambiguity makes the 
law easy to mold and, therefore, difficult to predict); see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our 
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty 
that a State may impose.”). 
 93. See Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981) 
(reasoning that the policy considerations that preclude a negligence standard are 
not applicable when the cause of action arises out of intentional misconduct by the 
insurer).   
 94. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465  
(Ark. 1984); see also Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 
1977) (stating that tort liability is only appropriate where it is clear that the insurer 
acted unreasonably in avoiding liability under the insured’s claim). 
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company’s denial of coverage to constitute bad faith as a matter of 
law.95  As a result, the law of bad faith in these states has proven to be 
consistent and predictable,96 and has provided proper notice to 
insurers about what conduct will subject them to liability.  
The same rationale applies equally to bad-faith statutes.  
Historically, these statutes present a mix of intentional and 
unreasonable acts brought under the umbrella of bad faith.97  
However, where private enforcement is authorized under these 
statutes, there exists the need for an intentional or reckless act, not a 
human error or simple miscommunication, as a basis to justify 
damages beyond the insurance contract.  Some states, such as 
Minnesota, have recently codified an intentional tort standard for 
bad faith through amendments to bad-faith laws.98  This is 
counterbalanced by other states’ recent changes to bad-faith statutes, 
such as those in Colorado and Washington, which lower the bar to a 
simple negligence standard.99   
By lowering the conduct standard for bad faith, states implicitly 
encourage less meritorious claims and permit the allegation of bad 
faith as standard practice in almost any insurance dispute.  Actions 
such as clerical errors or even a computer malfunction or virus could 
result in substantial extra-contractual damages where there is no 
                                                          
 95. See Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982) 
(noting that although the burden on the plaintiff is high, if an issue of material fact 
exists, the bad-faith tort claim must fail); see also Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445,  
453–54 (N.J. 1993) (allowing bad-faith tort claims only when a valid justification for 
the insurer’s denial could not possibly exist).  But see Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 
A.2d 997, 1005 (R.I. 2002) (“It makes little sense that an insurance company may . . . 
be insulated from tort liability for its bad-faith conduct because it fortuitously survives 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, yet is ultimately found to have breached 
the insurance contract.”); Marc S. Mayerson, “First Party” Insurance Bad Faith Claims:  
Mooring Procedure to Substance, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 861, 870–71 (2003) 
(criticizing as illogical the basis of the rule because if an insurer had a reasonable 
justification for denying the claim, it could not have acted in bad faith). 
 96. There are less than a hundred reported appellate decisions involving bad-
faith insurance claims settlement practices in Alabama and Arkansas in the past ten 
years. 
 97. See supra notes 51–61 and accompanying text (discussing the differences 
among states in the core elements of bad-faith statutes). 
 98. See S.F. 2822, 2008 Leg., 85th Sess. (Minn. 2008) (codified at MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 604.18 (West 2000)) (allowing a court to award “taxable costs” if an insured 
proves that an insurer denied a claim with a knowing or reckless disregard and 
without a reasonable basis).  
 99. See H.B. 1407, 2008 Leg., 66th Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008)) (implementing a reasonableness standard); S.B. 5726, 
2007 Leg., 60th Sess. (Wash. 2007) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015  
(Supp. 2009)) (noting that the insured may apply other claims against the insurer 
based on unfair or deceptive practices, which are not subject to the bill’s limits). 
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evidence of misconduct.100  As a basic public policy issue, this is 
unwise and more likely to deny justice.  Again, the concept of extra-
contractual damages represents a relatively new and significant 
departure in remedies; it follows that an award of such damages 
should be supported by something more than an act of carelessness 
or misjudgment.101   
2. Litigation of bad-faith claims should not intrude upon or duplicate the 
role of state regulators 
Under the present system in many states, bad-faith enforcement 
may occur both through private laws and government enforcement.102  
A claimant may bring a cause of action at common law or pursuant to 
a bad-faith claims settlement statute, and the state insurance 
department may initiate a separate action.  As a result of this dual 
enforcement, the insurer may be liable twice for the same or similar 
conduct.  While proponents of such regimes may argue that this 
merely provides additional incentive for insurers to stay above board 
in all of their dealings, the notion of double punishment for the same 
act runs contrary to fundamental fairness within the civil justice 
system.103   
In effect, a single insurer action may trigger several avenues for 
damages.  An insurer may be forced to pay full contract damages 
(i.e., the policy limit), extra-contractual damages, which may also 
include punitive damages (which may itself be a multiplier of the 
total compensatory award), and stiff penalties from the state 
insurance department.  As previously indicated, punitive damage 
awards alone may be millions of dollars, and state penalties, which 
likewise serve a punitive function, can reach hundreds of thousands 
                                                          
 100. See Employee Mut. Cas. Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 898, 909 (Miss. 
1986) (affirming punitive damages in the amount of $400,000 arising out of a bad-
faith claim against an insurance company, which denied a claim based on a claims 
adjustor’s misunderstanding despite the fact that the insurance company, upon 
learning of its mistake, immediately offered the correct compensation). 
 101. Unintentional errors more appropriately fall within the oversight of state 
insurance regulators who may fine insurers that fail to correct repeated errors.   
See infra Part II.A.4 (analyzing situations where an insurance company was found to 
have acted reasonably, although it was in error, and arguing that in such 
circumstances compensatory, not punitive damages, are the proper remedy). 
 102. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies 
among state statutes relating to bad-faith torts). 
 103. Cf. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448–49 (1989) (holding that civil 
penalties following a criminal conviction for the same act can violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause); Dep’t of Prof. & Occupational Reg. v. Abateco Serv., Inc., 534 
S.E.2d 352, 357 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that multiple civil fines for the same act 
are unconstitutional under a “gross disproportionality” standard). 
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of dollars.104  These damages are in addition to an insurer’s internal 
cost of compliance, so as to avoid future bad-faith litigation, and in 
some states, payment of the claimant’s attorneys’ fees and court 
costs.105  Taken together, the insurer may be dealt a heavy blow on 
multiple levels for a single improper act. 
Consider a scenario where a court does not require that bad faith 
include an element of intent.  An insurer disputes a claim, reasonably 
from its perspective, but due to a clerical error in data-entry, fails to 
meet a statute’s window of time for providing the proper claims 
forms.106  Although the insurer did not intend to act in bad faith, it is 
now in violation of a bad-faith statute and may be punished by being 
ordered to pay the reasonably disputed claim in full, subjected to 
extra-contractual damages, fined thousands of dollars by the state, 
and forced to reengineer its claims processing system.  Imagine 
further that this is an average-to-large-sized insurer with $2 billion in 
net premiums earned and a staff of hundreds who handle 
approximately 540,000 claims a year, or roughly 1,500 claims per 
day.107  Even with a well-trained staff, human errors such as the one in 
this hypothetical cannot be completely eliminated when such large 
numbers are involved.  Dual-enforcement by private and public actors 
makes this practically unavoidable scenario unjustifiable because it 
permits what amounts to multiple forms of punishment for the same 
act.108 
A balanced solution requires a more defined structure of 
enforcement.  Unintentional acts, which are nevertheless deemed 
unreasonable and inappropriately characterized as bad faith, should 
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-29-6 (2005) (establishing a damages range of 
$5,000 to $25,000 for each insurer violation up to $250,000); see also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text (highlighting several cases in which punitive damages amounted 
to tens of millions of dollars). 
 105. See supra notes 24, 64 (examining a variety of damages, created by state 
statutes, that may be awarded for an insurer’s bad-faith acts). 
 106. See statutes cited infra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (listing statutory 
time limits for filing a claim).  
 107. See generally BEST’S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES:  PROPERTY CASUALTY U.S. & 
CANADA (2008).  According to an analysis of A.M. Best data, an insurer with $2 billion 
in premium dollars (net premiums earned) handled an estimated annual average of 
approximately 540,000 claims from 2001–2007, or roughly 1,500 claims per day.  
These figures are based on data showing net premiums earned and claims reported 
across eight major lines of property casualty insurance.  Annual premiums of $2 
billion rank an insurer roughly 40th countrywide in highest total premiums and 
represent the average premium total of the top 250 insurers countrywide, which have 
ninety-five percent of U.S. market share. 
 108. In this example, paying full contract damages on a reasonably disputed claim 
which the insurer would have otherwise prevailed upon can be viewed as an 
additional form of punishment from the extra-contractual damages action and the 
state regulatory penalty. 
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fall within the sole jurisdiction of state regulatory authority.  After all, 
state insurance departments are charged with regulating insurance 
practices, and they develop comprehensive regulations to that end.  
They are in the best position to impose a commensurate fine to 
discourage on a state-wide basis acts that amount to simple error, 
without disrupting or skewing the true merits of the underlying 
insurance claim.109  Further, the claimant may individually recover 
damages caused by the delay under traditional contract theory.110  
By way of contrast, where the insurer engages in a purposeful and 
malicious act to deny coverage under a particular claim, the less 
exacting instrument of private tort litigation enables harsher 
punishment.  Courts should, therefore, refrain from permitting 
private bad-faith actions that may unfairly yield multiple recoveries 
where the basis of the action encroaches upon the very purpose and 
function of state regulatory authority. 
3. Courts should not imply a private right of action or use a claims 
settlement statute as a common law proxy unless expressly authorized by 
the state legislature 
While courts endeavor to iron out many differences within the law 
of bad faith and attain some semblance of uniformity among states, 
they should not, as a basic constitutional law principle, imply private 
rights of action for violations of insurance claims statutes.111  As a 
corollary, courts should also reject the use of claims settlement 
statutes as a proxy for what constitutes bad faith in a common law 
action because of the law’s inconsistent treatment and because of the 
historical context in which legislatures drafted these statutes. 
During the 1970s, as states began to embrace the common law 
expansion of a tort action for bad faith and legislatures quickly 
moved to enumerate bad-faith conduct,112 the specifics of the law 
                                                          
 109. See Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d. 576, 581 (N.H. 1978) 
(explaining the various benefits of the state insurance department bad-faith 
guidelines, including for instance, a policy that allows every fire insurance claimant 
the right to an independent appraiser of a claim, thereby preventing bad-faith action 
on the part of the insurer before the claim may be denied or delayed). 
 110. See id. (finding that contract remedies eliminate the need for a private cause 
of action). 
 111. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 
765 (2008) (arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers requires that courts 
only imply a cause of action “if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose 
the intent to create one”); cf. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
511 U.S. 164, 190–91 (1994) (discussing the “far-reaching consequences” of implying 
a cause of action under the Securities and Exchange Act). 
 112. See supra Part I (examining the motivations behind early bad-faith statutes 
and jurisprudence). 
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remained unsettled.  Courts generally recognized the importance of 
leveling the playing field in certain transactions, such as insurance, 
but concentrated their decisions on justifying the adoption of this 
new addition to the common law, a weighty proposition for any court, 
rather than analyzing its nuances.113  It is in this context that states 
enacted bad-faith statutes, incorporating the model NAIC 
legislation.114  These laws attempted to identify bad faith before the 
case law had adequately developed and defined “bad faith” (other 
than to acknowledge its existence).  The statutes were also often 
silent as to who had standing to sue.115  Indeed, many states at the 
time were still determining whether the common law action applied 
to first-party claimants, third-party claimants, or both.116  As case law 
developed and courts began tackling these issues, the results varied 
widely across states.117   
The expediency in which states, anxious to combat the bad acts of 
insurers, adopted wholesale NAIC’s model legislation, while 
presumably well-intentioned, has been a cause of the inconsistencies 
faced by both insurers and claimants today.  These laws not only 
diluted the substance of bad faith by reducing culpability to a 
negligence standard—an action that was subsequently rejected in the 
common law of a majority of states—but also exacerbated 
inconsistencies in standing by failing to clearly address enforcement 
of the statute.118  Moreover, because these statutes amount to a 
premature exploration of the law of bad faith, they should be treated 
as such by courts, which can and should minimize the impact of the 
statutes while still enforcing the law.  Courts should not, therefore, 
                                                          
 113. See supra Part I.B (arguing that the many discrepancies in interpretations of 
state laws addressing bad-faith tort claims may be attributed to the court’s failure to 
take into account the nuances of the statutes). 
 114. See supra notes 48–50 (discussing the adoption of the NAIC Model Act in 
1972 and listing the many states that adopted this Act nearly wholesale). 
 115. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the courts’ struggle 
to determine whether or not to allow first-party and third-party suits in insurance 
bad-faith tort claims). 
 116. See supra note 43 (discussing the expansion of standing in bad-faith tort 
claims during the 1970s and 1980s). 
 117. See supra Part II.B (arguing that one major point of diversion among states is 
the level of culpability required before punitive damages are awarded to the insured, 
and criticizing those states that allow punitive damages to be awarded in cases of 
mere negligence on the part of the insurer). 
 118. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 67–68 (Cal. 1988) 
(discussing the questions left unanswered by California’s introduction of a private 
action for bad-faith claims against insurers, including failing to explain what may be 
considered a “bad faith” action, who has standing, and the amount of damages 
available). 
 
2009] RESTORING THE GOOD FAITH IN BAD FAITH 1503 
imply a private right of action under an unfair claims settlement 
statute unless the legislature has expressly stated its intent to do so.119 
The use of a claims settlement statute as a proxy for a common law 
action for bad faith represents an issue of greater practical 
significance.  It is an established practice for courts to look to a 
closely related statute when determining the scope or applicability of 
the common law.120  Former Harvard Law School Dean James Landis, 
almost eighty years ago, articulated this “gravitational pull” effect in 
which a legislature’s statutory policy guides the development of the 
common law.121  Courts today often use insurance claims settlement 
statutes in this capacity.122  While this exercise may prove valid and 
insightful to courts in some instances, the law of bad faith presents 
the rare set of circumstances where this practice is inappropriate 
because the common law reflects a more contemporary view than the 
statutes reflect.  The common law of a majority of states has since 
rejected liability for the unintentional acts committed by insurers, 
contrary to the provisions of virtually all of the states’ unfair 
insurance claims settlement acts.  The courts’ use of such antiquated 
laws as a proxy to guide the common law, therefore, ignores and 
undermines the development of the law of bad faith. 
4. Where an insurer’s wrongful act is the result of a mistake or unintentional 
error, a right to cure without penalty should be permitted  
A key step in restoring a sense of balance to the law of bad faith is 
to curb the flow of bad-faith claims that have improperly fueled 
                                                          
 119. See infra Part III.B.1 (arguing that such a policy promotes fairness and has 
constitutional value). 
 120. See DeMaria v. DeMaria, 724 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Conn. 1999) (noting that 
“statutes are a useful source of policy for common-law adjudication, particularly 
when there is a close relationship between the statutory and common-law subject 
matters”); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 
(1982) (arguing that the United States legal system has shifted from being 
dominated by common law to being dominated by statutes); Ellen Ash Peters, 
Common Law Judging in a Statutory World:  An Address, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 995, 998 
(1982) (arguing that the role of statutes in the development of common law has 
evolved from being narrowly construed to avoid “derogation of the common law” to 
playing a central role—being taken “into account virtually all of the time”).  Courts 
now commonly use statutes to guide policy and provide “consistent common law 
development.” Id. 
 121. See James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL 
ESSAYS 213–14, 233 (R. Pound ed., 1934) (arguing that much of the common law 
actually originated in statutory legislation, and concluding that the “cavalier 
treatment of legislation” at the time was “certain to be a passing phenomenon”);  
see also Frank M. Coffin, Review:  The Problem of Obsolete Statutes:  A New Role for Courts?, 
91 YALE L.J. 827, 832 (1982) (discussing the connection between Guido Calabresi’s 
scholarly works on statutes and common law and those of James Landis). 
 122. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing how courts inferred 
private rights of action from statutes that may not explicitly grant them). 
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national litigation by focusing on minor technical infractions.  These 
claims may nevertheless trigger a state’s bad-faith claims settlement 
statute or be used as a proxy in a common law action.  For the most 
part, such claims involve instances where an insurer missed strict 
deadlines for “reasonable” claims-processing,123 where an insurer 
unintentionally failed to communicate certain information to the 
insured or another party,124 or where an insurer’s employee 
committed other human errors.125  These claims are often brought by 
enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys who seek out violations in hope of 
reaching a quick or greater settlement than may otherwise be 
warranted.126  Where such claims appear, and where it is clear that 
they are the result of a simple mistake, misunderstanding, or human 
error that the insurer is readily willing to correct, courts should 
recognize a “right to cure” and preclude a bad-faith lawsuit to recover 
extra-contractual damages.  Such an approach would properly focus 
the law on the tort law goal of promoting good behavior.  It would 
also not violate the tort law goal of promoting just compensation, 
because the corrective action by the insurer abates economic loss 
which may have been endured by the claimant. 
As stated throughout this Article, the central concept underlying 
the law of bad faith is to discourage bad acts which should equate, 
and do in most jurisdictions, to purposeful or reckless acts.   
The remedy of damages beyond the contract serves an essentially 
punitive and deterrent function against future bad acts.127  Mistakes 
and human error, and the insurers’ willingness to correct those 
mistakes, comport with neither justification.  Mistakes take place 
                                                          
 123. See, e.g., Porcelli v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-613-FtM-29DNF, 
2008 WL 2776725, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. July 15, 2008) (allowing a bad-faith action to 
proceed where the insurer did not meet the statute’s thirty-day deadline to provide 
policy information); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing reasonableness standards). 
 124. See, e.g., Kissoondath v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 909, 916 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 
1983)) (proposing that evidence of a failure to communicate a settlement offer to 
the insured supports a finding of bad faith by the insurer); Romano v. Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that bad-faith 
conduct includes failure to communicate with a claimant). 
 125. See, e.g., Town & Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 472 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the insurer’s statement of coverage and the 
discovery of the insured’s death two weeks after the accident were “attributable to 
mere human error” and reversing the trial court’s punitive damages award). 
 126. See supra note 6 (noting that attorneys handling claims against insurance 
companies seem to be more interested in finding evidence of bad faith than actually 
collecting on the claims).  
 127. See O’Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) 
(reasoning that “punitive damages can provide some degree of deterrent against 
unscrupulous insurers who would otherwise take advantage of customers and abuse 
their fiduciary relationship in order to promote their own economic self-interest”).  
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regardless of whether a remedy is limited to the contract or some 
measure of extra-contractual recovery.128  Furthermore, the remedy 
for such human error is already provided for in every state through 
regulatory enforcement and contract law.129  State insurance 
regulators are empowered to fine insurers for each and every mistake 
that results in a technical violation of the law, and where human 
errors are repeated to a level exceeding societal tolerances.130  
Regulatory authorities can also require improved practices for 
insurers and levy additional harsh penalties for noncompliance.131  
These penalties apply regardless of private enforcement.  If any 
economic losses remain after the insurer has taken action to correct 
its mistake, contract damages can provide for the direct economic 
losses incurred.  A bad-faith lawsuit seeking additional recovery for 
mistakes and unintended errors only serves as a windfall to plaintiffs 
and their attorneys. 
Permitting tort recovery for minor technical errors, in addition to 
lacking a rational justification, has other negative consequences.  
First, a successful private lawsuit has the practical effect of taking the 
place of state insurance regulation because it alters the insurers’ 
actions, but such de facto regulation is not subject to the public 
accountability of regulation by a state agency.  Second, allowing a 
private action in these instances may encourage an insurer’s bad faith 
by unjustly altering the litigation dynamic.  If an insurer commits an 
unintended error and is confronted with a bad-faith lawsuit, 
including the potential for punitive or exemplary damages, the 
insurer may be compelled to inappropriately challenge the claim that 
it made a mistake.132  Further, if a claimant’s settlement offer is 
unreasonably high, perhaps due to the superior bargaining position 
the claimant finds himself or herself in where a mistake has occurred, 
                                                          
 128. See Victor Schwartz & Christopher Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings 
in the Workplace:  Avoiding Injuries in Working with Industrial Materials, 73 MO. L. REV. 1, 
14–15 (2008) (discussing the cognitive limits of employees in the workplace). 
 129. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the roles and distinctions between regulators 
and litigators); see also Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1088–
90 (D.C. 2008) (rejecting tort liability against insurers and identifying other available 
remedies for insureds). 
 130. Statutes often refer to such repeated errors as acts committed “with such 
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 20-461 (2008); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-304 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 
(2009). 
 131. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 19, at 12 n.39 (listing various state statutes 
enacted at the turn of the century that allowed for recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
penalties). 
 132. Settlement typically provides a reasonable alternative, but if a plaintiff is 
unwilling to settle in hopes that a jury will award exemplary damages, litigation 
becomes the only recourse for the insurer.   
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the insurer may be compelled to litigate a claim based on a mistake in 
the hopes of paying only nominal damages.  In either event, 
dishonesty and cover-up are encouraged, which in addition to 
subverting justice, reduces efficiency and circumvents a state’s 
regulatory authority.133   
A right to cure a mistake or human error alleviates these system 
strains while providing greater efficiency and fairness.  If permitted to 
remedy the error without incurring additional penalties, insurers 
might be more likely to admit their mistakes, many of which might 
otherwise go undiscovered.  Hence, a right to cure could improve 
transparency and honesty in insurance claims-handling.   
A statutory right to cure is currently available in a minority of 
states.  Florida, for example, permits a right to cure “if, within 60 days 
after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving 
rise to the violation are corrected.”134  Similarly, West Virginia allows 
insurers a right to cure within 60 days of receiving notice of an action 
from the state’s insurance commissioner.135   
This notion of a right to cure also exists in many other legal 
incarnations such as sellers’ rights under the Uniform Commercial 
Code,136 a homeowner’s right of redemption,137 and various other 
consumer transactions.138  Similar to a buyer receiving a non-
conforming product under a sales contract and the seller being able 
to redress the issue, the insurer should be able to rectify an 
unsatisfactory handling of claims under an insurance contract.   
The principle of encouraging “cure” is common in other areas of law 
as well.  For example, rules of evidence preclude the admission of 
subsequent remedial measures to improve the safety of a product or 
service when it is offered as proof of an admission of fault.139 
By allowing a right to cure and by precluding a bad-faith lawsuit 
where the insurer makes a clear effort to correct its mistake, courts 
                                                          
 133. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how private bad-faith actions may 
unnecessarily mirror state regulatory actions). 
 134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155(3)(d) (2009); see also Talat Enter., Inc. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing the legislature’s 
intent to provide insurers a sixty-day window as a final resort to comply with their 
contractual obligations). 
 135. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-11-4a(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 136. U.C.C. § 2-508 (2003). 
 137. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-302 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (2008); 
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.011 (2007). 
 138. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 537.5110 (2009) (consumer right to cure credit debts); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-51-3 (2008) (right to cure automobile payment deficiency prior to 
repossession); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006) (plan to cure defaults during 
bankruptcy). 
 139. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
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and legislatures could greatly improve the landscape of bad-faith 
claims; they could improve the efficiency and transparency of claims-
handling and promote fairness to both sides of insurance 
transactions. 
5. Courts should recognize a limited action for reverse bad faith against 
insurers  
Until now, bad-faith law has been almost exclusively a one-way 
street.140  Claimants may maintain a tort cause of action under statute 
or common law against the insurer for a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but insurers in those same 
jurisdictions are extended no reciprocal right of action for claimants’ 
wrongful acts.141  The justifications for this facial inequity are not 
entirely clear or persuasive other than that there is virtually no case 
law to support a “reverse bad-faith” claim.142  Yet, as one may recall, 
this situation is strikingly reminiscent of the landscape of bad-faith 
law only decades ago.143  At the time, it was clear one side had an 
                                                          
 140. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038, 
1041 (Cal. 1980) (stating that the “duty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance 
policy is a two-way street, running from the insured to his insurer as well as vice 
versa,” but holding that no reciprocal right applies); Douglas R. Richmond,  
The Two-way Street of Insurance Good Faith:  Under Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 95, 140 (1996) (arguing in favor of a reverse bad-faith right of action). 
 141. See William S. Anderson, Placing a Check on an Insured’s Bad Faith Conduct:   
The Defense of “Comparative Bad Faith,” 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 528–31 (1994) 
(observing court decisions that have rejected reverse bad-faith claims); John F. 
Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street?, 62 N.D. L. REV. 355, 
357–67 (1986) (examining a brief history of bad-faith claims); Cathryn M. Little, 
Fighting Fire with Fire:  “Reverse Bad Faith” in First-Party Litigation Involving Arson and 
Insurance Fraud,  
19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 43, 44-46 (1996) (noting that there are few published opinions 
citing “reverse bad faith,” none of which recognize the claim as a cause of action); 
Douglas R. Richmond, Insured’s Bad Faith as Shield or Sword:  Litigation Relief for 
Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 41, 69 (arguing in favor of a bad-faith cause of action for 
insurers); Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas, Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith:  
Insured’s Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Affirmative Defense or 
Counterclaim, 23 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 215, 216 n.7 (1987) (recognizing 
California as the only state that has adopted a reverse bad-faith rule).  
 142. Several courts have attested to the lack of case law supporting a reverse bad-
faith claim.  See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Shah, No. 6:00-cv-489-
ORL28KRS, 2001 WL 273244, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2001) (adhering to the 
common law when a bad-faith claim was not yet ripe for consideration); In re Tutu 
Water Wells Contamination Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. V.I. 1999) (denying 
insurers’ reverse bad-faith claim on summary judgment); Johnson v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1995) (claiming to be unaware of any 
jurisdiction adopting the tort of reverse bad-faith claims); see also Willia Corroon 
Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing serious doubts 
about whether a reverse bad-faith action exists without completely foreclosing the 
recognition of such an action); cf. Parker v. D’Avolio, 664 N.E.2d 858, 864 n.9 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 1996) (cautioning in a landlord tenant case that “courts be vigilant to 
ensure that plaintiffs not engage in ‘reverse bad faith’ conduct”). 
 143. See supra Part I.A (discussing the history and development of bad faith). 
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advantage in insurance transactions and at least an arguable ability to 
engage in abusive acts without sufficient deterrence.  It took one high 
court’s ruling to set in motion changes on a national scale and 
restore, albeit temporarily, a sense of balance in insurance claims-
handling.144   
If the history of bad-faith law is to repeat itself by recognizing a 
reciprocal action for insurers against their insureds, it might well 
have received its first signs of life from a court in its birthplace of 
California.  In California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior 
Court,145 the California Court of Appeal held that an insurer in a bad-
faith action could assert as an affirmative defense the tort concept of 
comparative fault.146  The plaintiff in the case brought a bad-faith 
claim against his insurer alleging unreasonable delay in providing 
coverage under an uninsured motorist claim, which the insurer 
believed to be a questionable and potentially frivolous claim.147   
The insurer claimed comparative bad faith on the plaintiff’s part and 
sought attorneys’ fees.148  The court agreed with the insurer and held 
that comparative bad faith provided a valid defense.149  The court also 
appeared to be acutely aware of the implications of its decision, 
stating that “most defenses now recognized in tort cases were at one 
time novel and not expressly recognized in published judicial 
decisions.”150  
For fifteen years, this decision stood in California.151  In Kransco v. 
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,152 however, the state high 
court retreated from these reverse bad-faith footholds and invalidated 
the defense.153  The majority reasoned that the comparative bad-faith 
defense “misleadingly equates an insured’s contractual breach of the 
reciprocal covenant of good faith and fair dealing with an insurer’s 
                                                          
 144. See supra Part I.A (discussing the role of the California Supreme Court in 
engineering tort recovery for bad faith). 
 145. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 146. See id. at 822 (additionally noting that the insured owed an implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing to the insurer).  
 147. Id. at 818–19.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 823 (explaining that while the duty of good faith is a contractual term, 
breach of this duty is governed by tort principles). 
 150. Id. at 821.  
 151. The Chief Justice of California characterized California Casualty as “the 
seminal California decision that has been the controlling California authority on this 
issue for the past 15 years.”  Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 
17 (Cal. 2000) (George, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 152. 2 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2000). 
 153. Id. at 4.  The court in Kransco relied on a 1999 California Court of Appeal 
decision that rejected a reverse bad-faith claim.  See Agric. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 600–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding 
that the reverse bad-faith claim had no support in case law).  
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tortious breach of the covenant,”154 and that an insurer’s tort liability 
for breach of the covenant is “predicated upon special policy factors 
inapplicable to the insured.”155  Although the court did not detail 
these policy factors in its decision, they were discussed in a California 
Court of Appeal opinion issued a year earlier in Agricultural Insurance 
Co. v. Superior Court,156 which similarly rejected an insurer’s reverse 
bad-faith claim.  That court summarized the special policy factors as 
follows: 
An insured seeks peace of mind and economic protection against 
calamity, the insurer provides that protection for a fee.  Although 
the insured depends upon the insurer for protection, the insurer 
does not depend on the insured in the same manner.  Insurers 
occupy the “status as purveyors of a vital service labeled quasi-
public in nature.”  Thus an insurer’s obligations can include a duty 
to place the interests of the insured on at least an equal footing 
with its own interests, because the “obligations of good faith and 
fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity” similar 
to the responsibilities of a fiduciary.  Insurance contracts are 
usually adhesive in nature, since their terms are generally 
contained in form language dictated by the insurer . . . .   
An insurer’s breach can therefore frustrate the core purpose of 
insurance (protecting the insured from calamity) and leave the 
insured exposed to a disaster it has paid to avoid.157 
These policy justifications are echoed by high courts in other states, 
such as Ohio and Iowa, which have also directly addressed and 
rejected an insurer action for reverse bad faith.158   
As sound public policy, such justifications appear somewhat 
suspect.  They are premised on the idea that despite entering the 
same contract, with the same implication of good faith and fair 
dealing, the actual obligations should be different because 
performance of the contract “matters more” to the insured.  While it 
may be true that an insurer, generally speaking, has more resources 
to insulate itself from financial hardship, this does not mean that the 
total financial loss experienced from an act of bad faith is any less 
when it happens to an insurer.  Insurance fraud is estimated to cost 
                                                          
 154.  Kransco, 2 P.3d at 12. 
 155.  Id. at 11. 
 156.  82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 157. Id. at 600 (citations omitted); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 
373, 374 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting the application of the insurance law theory of tortious 
breach of covenant in an employment law action). 
 158. See Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1995) 
(finding that a motion for sanctions under local rule 80(a) provides sufficient 
remedy); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 945 (Ohio 
1992) (noting that insurers have other means of protection). 
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the industry approximately $80 billion per year.159  Nevertheless, that 
the insurer is virtually always the wealthier party in the litigation 
appears to be the underlying justification for making a distinction in 
the law.  Insurance may be “big business,” but that has never provided 
a legitimate basis to apply unequal protection under the law.  
Further, in most situations, these costs are ultimately borne not by a 
“wealthy insurer,” but by ordinary policyholders who end up paying 
more for insurance because of the wrongful acts of relatively few 
policyholders.160 
The other special factors proffered—that an insured seeks peace of 
mind and that insurance contracts are adhesive—also do little to 
justify disparate treatment for insurers.  First, parties to any contract 
seek peace of mind.  It is a basic purpose of contracting.  The buyer 
seeks peace of mind that the seller will perform as scheduled and the 
seller rests easier once it has found a buyer for its good or service.  
Second, the fact that insurance contracts are adhesive has nothing to 
do with the implied covenant of good faith.  Contract provisions, 
adhesive or not, are express terms that apply to a specific agreement, 
while the implied covenant of good faith applies to every 
agreement.161  Consequently, as a matter of policy, there is little 
rational justification for not allowing a reverse bad-faith claim where 
a private action has been recognized under common law. 
Combining the other general principles discussed, a reverse bad-
faith claim would likely be very limited in practice.  It should only 
apply to intentional and purposeful acts by claimants to either receive 
a payment where payment is inappropriate, or to inflate a claim 
amount.  From a public policy vantage, it would provide additional 
incentive for persons making a claim against an insurer to state the 
measure of damages more accurately and honestly, which in turn 
would reduce the costs of insurance for consumers.  A reverse bad-
faith action would also only be appropriate where the common law 
permits private enforcement against an insurer, thereby respecting 
constitutional law principles discussed previously against implying 
causes of action. 
                                                          
 159. See How Big is $80 Billion?, Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/80_billion.htm (last visited July 27, 2009) 
(illustrating the extent of the loss that results from insurance fraud). 
 160. See generally Insurance Fraud, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/insurance_fraud.htm (last visited July 27, 
2009) (explaining that insurance fraud costs the average U.S. family between $400 
and $700 per year in the form of increased premiums). 
 161. See Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914) (recognizing 
that the good-faith requirement underlies all contracts). 
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Moreover, a reverse bad-faith action would be less akin to creating 
a new cause of action than applying an existing action equally.   
Also, given the respective roles in an insurance relationship, the 
appropriate extra-contractual remedy for the insurer in most 
instances would be limited to attorneys’ fees for the claimant’s willful 
and malicious conduct.162  Although courts have yet to embrace 
reverse bad-faith actions, such actions comport with objectives of 
fundamental fairness and equal protection, and greater system 
efficiency and effectiveness.163  Also vital to these public policy 
objectives is the fact that an overwhelming number of “honest” 
policyholders would benefit from lower premiums if the acts of 
dishonest policyholders were properly sanctioned. 
B. Principles Applicable to Bad-Faith Statutes 
1. Courts need to clearly identify who may bring a statutory “bad-faith” 
action  
Independent of the common law, state legislatures have enacted 
statutes to govern bad faith in insurance claims handling.   
As previously discussed, these laws were derived from model 
legislation and many incorporate the same or substantially similar 
provisions.164  Also as discussed, many of these laws suffer 
shortcomings that have led courts to apply widely divergent 
interpretations and have caused inconsistency in the state of bad-faith 
law.165  One of the most basic shortcomings is that many of these laws 
are ambiguous as to who may bring a statutory cause of action for bad 
faith.   
                                                          
 162. In a related issue, a majority of courts permit an insurer to recover attorneys’ 
fees where the insurer defends non-covered acts under the insurance agreement.   
See Joseph Cunningham & James Markels, Attorneys’ Fees Incurred In Defending 
Insurance Policy Non-Covered Claims:  Who Pays?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 69, 
74–76 (2007) (reviewing majority and minority views across various jurisdictions);  
see also Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d 1092, 
1098 (Ill. 2005) (considering whether a contract must stipulate the right to recover 
costs and attorneys’ fees). 
An insurer’s decision to initially provide representation in a situation where such 
representation is not required is often made out of fear of subsequent bad-faith 
litigation in the event the insurer is mistaken.  See supra note 9 and accompanying 
text (discussing rising costs and increasing damage awards in bad-faith suits). 
 163. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and 
Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 136–37 (1994) (enumerating reasons why courts 
should apply reserve bad faith). 
 164. See supra Part I.B (discussing the various types of bad faith claims settlement 
statutes adopted from state to state). 
 165. See supra Part I.B. 
 
1512 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1477 
Identification of a class of potential claimants is particularly 
important due to another alleged flaw in many states’ laws:  the 
varying degree of culpability necessary to establish bad faith.166   
A claimant who is unable to bring a common-law action for bad faith 
because the level of culpability requires an intentional or reckless act 
will instead attempt a statutory cause of action where lesser 
misconduct—e.g., negligence—may support a claim.  Courts should 
identify the scope of such statutes not only to prevent this derogation 
of the common law, but also to establish clear boundaries to reduce 
uncertainty or unfair surprise for litigants.  
Principles of statutory construction provide the starting point in 
determining the scope of ambiguous claims settlement laws, and the 
text, context, and history of these laws should carry the day.167   
Again, as a general principle, where a statute does not expressly 
create a private cause of action, courts should exercise a high level of 
restraint before implying one.168  Similarly, where the text of a claims 
settlement statute expressly states that the insurance commissioner 
may bring an action or impose a fine (as most of the statutes do), but 
where the statute fails to mention a similar right for an individual 
claimant, courts should hold that the legislature did not intend a 
private right of action.  Courts addressing this issue have almost 
uniformly agreed and precluded a right.169   
Where a statute omits reference to public or private enforcement, 
the context and history of the law deserve deference.  In every state, 
the claims settlement statute is included in a code section regulating 
the practice of insurance.170  This body of law is enforced by the state 
insurance department and typically does not provide for private 
enforcement.  In contrast, in states like Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania where a private right of action for bad faith is expressly 
provided, the state legislature has included that right under a 
                                                          
 166. See supra Part I.B. 
 167. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 129 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that when the Court “perform[s] this gap-filling 
task, it is appropriate not only to study the text and structure of the statutory scheme, 
but also to examine its legislative history”). 
 168. See cases cited supra note 111 (cautioning against an implied cause of action). 
 169. See cases cited supra notes 60–61 (discussing claims that were based on an 
implied cause of action).  In 1990, NAIC approved a separate model act entitled the 
Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.  UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES 
ACT § 1, reprinted in NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND 
GUIDELINES 900–01 (1991).  This Act, unlike the 1972 model legislation, contains a 
“Drafting Note” stating that any jurisdiction choosing to provide a private cause of 
action should consider a different statutory scheme, and that the Act “is inherently 
inconsistent with a private cause of action.”  Id. 
 170. See supra note 47 (listing the various state statutes that address bad-faith and 
unfair insurance claims). 
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separate section of law, such as the civil code,171 or through a 
constitutional amendment.172  The placement of these laws in state 
regulatory codes as opposed to sections relevant to individuals’ rights 
suggests that the law is meant for public enforcement.  Also, in other 
states expressly codifying a private right of action, like Montana173 and 
Florida,174 the private action is codified in separate statutes.  
Historically, claims settlement statutes represented a push by state 
legislatures to compliment the common law, not to override it.   
The statutes were enacted during the same period in which states first 
expanded their common law to include bad faith; statutes and 
common law were thus at the same level of development.  There was 
little need to expedite the law’s passage if only to codify private 
enforcement of common law.  Rather, it is more plausible that these 
laws were designed to provide a separate level of protection through 
state regulatory enforcement.   
Overall, the construction of states’ claims settlement statutes leads 
to the conclusion that enforcement should be deemed exclusive to a 
state’s insurance department or commissioner.  Courts not yet 
addressing the complete scope of unfair claims settlement laws 
should, therefore, refrain from expanding the action to first-party or 
third-party claimants.  From an enforcement perspective, the 
regulatory and common law systems left in place are also more 
consistent.175  The state regulates unreasonable insurer practices and 
takes enforcement action against violators through its insurance 
regulatory arm, and the common law is left to redress intentional and 
reckless acts above contractual or compensatory damages.  The fact 
that the common law of bad faith continues to develop (in contrast to 
claims settlement statutes that are changed less often) also makes the 
common law ideally suited to addressing more culpable and varied 
insurer “bad” acts.  By clearly identifying the scope of ambiguous 
unfair claims statutes as publicly enforceable by state insurance 
regulators, courts can establish a simpler, more efficient system of 
enforcement. 
                                                          
 171. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (2008) (allowing an insured to bring a bad-faith 
action against the insurer). 
 172. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2008) (allowing courts to award interest, 
punitive damages, costs, and fees if they have found that the insurer acted in bad 
faith towards the insured). 
 173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2007). 
 174. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155 (2009).  
 175. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that bad-faith claims should not both be 
privately litigated and should instead fall under the state’s regulatory scheme). 
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2. Overly mechanical application of deadlines for reasonable investigation 
and payment of claims should be avoided 
A central concept present in all claims settlement statutes is 
reasonableness.176  If an insurer fails to process, investigate, or pay a 
claim within a “reasonable” period, then its delay may constitute an 
act of bad faith.177  Generally, in a statutory action brought by the 
state insurance commissioner or, where permitted, a private 
claimant,178 the determination of a reasonable period is made by a 
jury.179  Given the wide spectrum of circumstances that could make 
delay more reasonable in one case than in another, and given the 
clear potential for over- and under-inclusiveness in attempting to 
provide greater definition to what is reasonable, the law appropriately 
leaves this decision in jurors’ hands.  A significant minority of states, 
however, supplant this jury function by legislating strict time periods 
for unreasonable delay in insurance claims-handling.180   
For example, in states like Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South 
Dakota, an insurer violates the state’s unfair claims settlement act 
whenever it fails to respond to a claim within thirty days.181   
In Georgia, Missouri, and Nebraska, an insurer must provide to a 
claimant the necessary claims forms within fifteen days of a 
reasonable request.182  Other states set the period of reasonableness at 
ten183 or twenty days.184   
                                                          
 176. See supra note 47 (listing the various state statutes that address bad-faith and 
unfair insurance claims).  In some states, like Alabama, the statute contains the 
terminology “without just cause,” which approximates to a reasonableness test.   
ALA. CODE § 27-12-24 (2009). 
 177. See, e.g., Filasky v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 76 (Ariz. 1988); 
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994); Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 
347 N.W.2d 595 (Wis. 1984); see also Henderson, supra note 88, at 1159–60 
(enumerating acts of bad faith in addition to unreasonable delay or denial of 
claims).  
 178. A key distinction here is that the standard under most statutory actions 
brought by the state insurance commissioner is negligence, while only a minority of 
states permit private statutory enforcement under this reasonableness standard or 
under the state’s common law standard.  See supra Part I (discussing the history and 
development of bad faith and bad-faith statutes).  
 179. See supra note 79 (recognizing the flexibility given to juries in determining 
what constitutes bad faith). 
 180. Such states include Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 1250.4(C) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(a)(16) 
(2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-67(1) (2008). 
 182. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-34(11) (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1007(13) (2008); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1540(14) (2008). 
 183. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-9.1-4(a)(13) (2009). 
 184. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2009). 
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Even more restrictive are time limits dictating when a claim must 
be settled or paid.  In New Mexico and West Virginia, for instance, an 
insurer has ninety days to pay a claim after the insured files a proof of 
loss form.185  In Connecticut, this period is only forty-five days,186 and 
in Nevada and Wisconsin it is thirty days.187 
While statutory deadlines can provide a useful benchmark for 
determining what is reasonable under the circumstances of a 
particular insurance claim, and can provide an incentive for insurers 
to act promptly, they should not, in the event of a missed deadline, 
necessarily trigger tort liability for bad faith.  Rather, strict adherence 
to a statutory time period imposes a negligence per se rule.  Such 
unbending application fails to provide latitude for reasonable excuses 
or other unintentional errors or miscommunications that ordinarily 
act to preclude a bad-faith action.   
Strict adherence to time limitations as a basis for a bad-faith claim 
represents poor public policy for several reasons.188  First, as 
mentioned above, such strict adherence diminishes the vital role of 
the jury in the civil justice system, and does so in perhaps the most 
suitable subject area for a jury to determine; that is, whether 
something sounds reasonable to an ordinary person.  Second, a hard 
deadline removes any determination of culpability, such as whether 
the insurer intentionally acted to cause an unreasonable delay or 
denial of a claim; this determination is essential in evaluating the 
extent of liability and the amount of punishment necessary to deter 
similar acts in the future.  Third, strict enforcement of a deadline for 
bad-faith purposes demonstrates a lack of understanding and an 
attempt at standardization in an industry where every insurance claim 
is different and requires varying levels of attention.  Finally, and most 
importantly, strict enforcement of a statutory deadline provides an 
incentive for a claimant to abuse the insurance system, which is 
already rife with attempts at fraud.189   
                                                          
 185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20(F) (2008); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(o) (2008). 
 186. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38A-816(15)(B) (2008).  Connecticut’s statute contains 
an exception to this deadline where the information provided under a claim is 
deficient. 
 187. NEV. REV. STAT. § 690B.012 (2009); WIS. STAT. § 628.46 (2008). 
 188. One type of strict time restriction, which exists in several states, applies to the 
payment of claims after the insurer has affirmatively acknowledged liability and 
should be viewed in a separate light.  For example, in Hawaii and Maine, an insurer 
has thirty days to tender payment after accepting liability.  See HAW. REV. STAT.  
§ 431:13-103(11)(F) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A § 2436(1) (2008).  This situation 
is distinguishable because the claim-processing and investigation periods have 
terminated.  The insurer has an undisputed liability, meaning it is less likely that 
there is a reasonable basis for not paying within the legislatively prescribed period. 
 189. See supra note 159 (noting the annual losses to the insurance companies). 
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If a claimant can prevail in a cause of action for bad faith whenever 
an insurer fails to meet a statute’s arbitrary deadline, the claimant is 
more likely to engage in delay tactics or otherwise frustrate the 
insurer’s claims-handling process.190  Simple yet effective strategies 
include throwing out claims forms or other correspondence, 
changing a mailing address to delay actual receipt of forms, or 
providing deficient information to extend the investigation process.  
Where there is an ultimate deadline for payment, the claimant can 
bolster his or her bargaining position by unreasonably refusing to 
settle a claim for anything less than the policy limit.   
A claimant may also be able to successfully lure an insurer into 
committing a bad faith violation by purporting to negotiate in good 
faith.  For example, in Berges v. Infinity Insurance Co.,191 the Florida 
Supreme Court permitted a bad-faith claim to proceed against an 
insurer where the insurer entered an agreement to pay the insured’s 
policy limits within the required time deadline, but had not yet 
formally consummated the settlement and dispersed the money.192  
This occurred because the insurer could not forward actual payment 
until the claimant had the legal authority to execute releases on 
behalf of the estate and guardianship for the underlying wrongful 
death claim.193  As one of the dissenting judges recognized: 
[T]here are strategies which have developed in the pursuit of 
insurance claims which are employed to create bad-faith claims 
against insurers when, after an objective, advised view of the 
insurer’s claims handling, bad faith did not occur . . . .  Obviously, 
this strategy worked well for the claimants and their attorneys in 
this particular case.194 
The ease of proof, a missed deadline, also makes strict 
enforcement of these laws disconcerting.  Statutes supposedly 
designed to facilitate reasonable investigation of insurance claims 
remove the court’s ability to investigate what really occurred.  Most of 
these time restrictions look only to whether the period has expired, 
and not to who caused the lapse; in doing so, the restrictions 
                                                          
 190. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Adjusters and Plaintiffs’ Attorneys:  From 
Claims Fraud Consensus to Settlement Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 538, 567–68 (1993) 
(noting that the ease with which claimants can pursue a bad-faith claim adversely 
impacts insurers’ ability to investigate because they are working within shorter time 
constraints imposed by the claimant).  
 191. 896 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2004). 
 192. Id. at 676. 
 193. See id. at 692 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority placed the 
insurer in a tough position by giving it the option of forwarding payment to a person 
not authorized to execute a release or to be subject to a bad-faith lawsuit). 
 194. Id. at 685 (Wells, J., dissenting). 
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effectively encourage bad faith or unreasonable behavior by a 
claimant.  This result is compounded by the lack of a reciprocal bad-
faith action for insurers.195  Instead, the insurer is left with little 
recourse other than a fraud action, which is a comparatively more 
difficult lawsuit to maintain and prevail in than a lawsuit where the 
insurer is only required to show a purposeful or reckless act by the 
claimant.196   
To prevent such abuse, courts should refrain from overly 
mechanical application of statutory time periods for claims-handling 
and payment, and leave it to a trier of fact to construe an insurer’s 
actions with a view as to the reasonableness of the insurer’s actions 
under the circumstances.  State legislatures, for their part, must also 
appreciate the unintended negative consequences that strict 
adherence to time limits can cause, and should provide express 
exceptions for reasonable delay.197  Further, both courts and 
legislatures can avoid the destructive power shift of per se violations 
of claims-processing deadlines by applying the principles discussed in 
this Article.  Namely, requiring intentional or reckless acts to 
maintain any bad-faith action, identifying exclusive enforcement by 
state regulators where a statute is ambiguous, refusing to use unfair 
claims settlement statutes as a proxy for common law actions, 
recognizing a right to cure, and permitting reverse bad faith actions 
would all help preclude abuse of hard deadlines for claims handling. 
3. Courts should recognize meaningful exceptions to bad-faith statutes 
A broader issue related to rigid time limits in insurance claims 
settlement statutes is the need for courts to recognize meaningful 
statutory exceptions to safeguard the interests of justice.198  Because 
most claims settlement statutes establish liability for actions deemed 
unreasonable as opposed to intentional, courts should exercise a 
greater degree of leniency and understanding to the conditions faced 
by insurers.  This is necessary, in part, to respect the fact that actions 
                                                          
 195. See sources cited supra Part II.A.5 (arguing for a limited bad-faith action for 
insurers against claimants). 
 196. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text (explaining that bad-faith 
action developed for claimants as a result of the difficulty of maintaining a fraud 
action). 
 197. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628.46(2) (West 2004) (providing an exception for 
the thirty-day period in which the insurer must pay a claim where there is no 
recipient legally able to give a valid release for such payment or where the insurer is 
unable to determine who is entitled to receive payment). 
 198. This principle also incorporates many of the same justifications for a right to 
cure.  See supra Part II.A.4 (arguing that insurers should have a right to cure a minor 
infraction to ensure that bad-faith law focuses solely on intentional, bad acts). 
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held unreasonable by courts enforcing a private statutory cause of 
action will likely trigger an additional penalty through state 
regulatory oversight.199  Courts should, therefore, recognize 
exceptions where an insurer’s actions are “fairly debatable” under the 
circumstances of a claim investigation,200 or where an insurer’s actions 
are reasonable but nevertheless lead to an incorrect outcome.201 
A Mississippi Supreme Court case, Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Tompkins,202 provides an example demonstrating the need to respect 
an insurer’s reasonable, yet ultimately incorrect decisions.  Although 
the case involved a common law action, the same principles of 
reasonableness discussed in this Article fit within the often more 
stringent confines of a state’s statutes.  In that case, an uninsured 
motorist backed out of her driveway and was struck by the insured 
defendant’s motorcycle.203  The insured filed an uninsured motorist 
claim with his insurer, and a claims adjuster initially denied the claim 
believing that the defendant’s coverage applied only to the two cars 
listed on the policy.204  Five months later, the insurer received a letter 
from the insured’s attorney requesting further investigation and 
settlement.205  An attorney for the insurer took over the claim 
investigation, and was advised by local counsel for the area where the 
accident took place that the effective policy limit was $20,000.206   
The insurer promptly offered $20,000, which was declined.207   
                                                          
 199. See supra note 104 (citing a Rhode Island statute that establishes a damages 
range for each insurer violation up to $250,000). 
 200. See, e.g., Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 829, 832 (Idaho 
2002) (requiring the insured to prove as part of its prima facie case that the insurer’s 
denial was not fairly debatable); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997, 1010  
(R.I. 2002) (allowing the insurer to debate a claim that is fairly debatable). 
 201. The Nevada Supreme Court expressed this concern in Powers v. United Services 
Automobile Ass’n:   
A mere incorrect or “improper” denial of a claim is not tortious.  A company 
may, in the utmost of good faith and propriety, deny a claim, only to have it 
proven later, in court, that its denial of the claim was improper and that the 
claimant was, indeed, entitled to indemnity.  Under the instruction as given, 
all an insurance company would have to do to become liable to its insured 
for commission of the bad-faith tort would be to deny mistakenly a claim 
“without proper cause,” that is to say, to deny a questionable claim that it 
should, properly, have paid—a rather common occurrence in the insurance 
world. 
962 P.2d 596, 620 (Nev. 1998); see also O’Leary-Alison v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
752 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (refusing to hold an insurer’s good-faith, 
but mistaken valuation of damages as a violation of the state’s claims settlement 
statute). 
 202. 490 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1986). 
 203. Id. at 898–99. 
 204. Id. at 900. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 901. 
 207. Id. 
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The insured’s attorney responded with a demand for $50,000 to be 
paid in five days or a lawsuit would commence alleging compensatory 
and punitive damages.208  The insurer then sought a declaratory 
judgment in federal court to determine the correct policy limit.209  
When the court found that the effective limit was $50,000, the insurer 
immediately offered that amount, which was refused as well.210   
The subsequent bad-faith lawsuit resulted in $50,000 in 
compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages against the 
insurer.211  The jury also found that the uninsured motorist, who was 
joined in the action, was modestly negligent and returned a verdict of 
only $500.212  Rather, the insured, who sustained serious injuries, was 
held to have contributed heavily to the accident.213  In other words, 
because the insured was the primary cause of his accident, “the 
insurer would have had ample reason to dispute the claim vigorously 
and to question whether any payment was due even if it recognized 
$50,000 in coverage from the outset.”214   
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately reduced the 
compensatory award to $500, yet affirmed the punitive damages 
award on the ground that the insurer should not have included an 
ambiguous and invalid exclusion provision in its contracts,215 the case 
illustrates how a trial court can unreasonably punish an insurer.  
True, the insurer was incorrect, but when made aware of its error the 
insurer twice offered what it reasonably believed to be the policy 
limit, and did so in a case in which it might not have been obligated 
to pay at all.   
In situations where the insurer’s actions prove incorrect, 
compensatory relief is the appropriate remedy, including any interest 
and attorneys’ fees for the delay caused by litigation.216  However, 
additional penalties for bad faith, like punitive damages, are 
unjustified where misjudgment or miscalculation provides the basis 
for an unreasonable delay or denial of a claim.  While the common 
law of most states rejects such bad-faith claims by requiring 
                                                          
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 901–02. 
 214. William T. Barker & Paul E.B. Glad, Use of Summary Judgment in Defense of Bad 
Faith Actions Involving First-Party Insurance, 30 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 49, 79 
(1994) (emphasis in original). 
 215. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d at 903. 
 216. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (prescribing a fifteen 
percent annual rate of interest for bad-faith claims settlement beginning from the 
date the loss was payable until the date of the verdict). 
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intentional unreasonable delay or denial, statutes giving rise to a 
private right of action may lack this standard.  Hence, courts 
interpreting statutory private rights of action should, as routine 
practice, recognize exceptions that protect the right of the insurer to 
contest a claim without malice, and occasionally be incorrect.217   
4. Comparisons to insurer offers and amounts ultimately recovered through 
litigation represent poor policy for allowing bad-faith claims to proceed  
The need for courts to articulate meaningful exceptions to bad-
faith statutes is particularly evident with regard to a common 
provision in the statutes of most states that compares an insurer’s 
settlement offer with the amount ultimately awarded through 
litigation.  The provision typically states that an insurer cannot 
engage in a practice of offering claimants “substantially less” than the 
amount ultimately recovered in a lawsuit.218  As an indicator of bad 
faith, this provision is over-inclusive and misleading, and as policy, 
unjust and oppressive.  The insurer can effectively be punished for 
acting reasonably and in good faith at all times. 
Choosing to litigate an insurance claim is a costly undertaking for 
an insurer, regardless of the economies of scale an insurer might 
possess.  There are attorneys’ fees and other unavoidable costs, and 
the outcome is uncertain.  Insurers are also not blind to the poor 
public perception of their industry; a perception that contributed to 
the creation of tort liability in insurance contracts where it does not 
exist in other contexts.219  The prospect of paying extra-contractual 
damages, especially punitive damages, is itself daunting; this daunting 
prospect is enhanced by the insurer’s position as an unpopular 
defendant and the belief of many juries that insurers have deep 
                                                          
 217. A number of state statutes include express exceptions for claims delays where 
the insurer is conducting or cooperating with an investigation into arson or fraud.  
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.18(2)(c) (West Supp. 2008) (creating an exception 
where the insurer is conducting or cooperating with a timely investigation into arson 
or fraud).  Such a caveat is important to respecting an insurer’s ability to reasonably 
contest or investigate suspect claims without being pressured into paying the claim to 
avoid a bad-faith lawsuit, especially in the event that the insurer’s reasonable 
suspicion ultimately does not evidence arson or fraud.   
 218. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-4-1-4.5(7) (LexisNexis 1999) (allowing insureds 
to recover amounts due under an insurance policy when the insurer offers 
substantially less than the amount ultimately recovered in a lawsuit). 
 219. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Land Developers Constr. Co., 882 So. 2d 291, 304  
(Ala. 2003) (Houston, J., concurring) (observing that outside of the insurance 
context, parties to a contract may breach even in bad faith without being subject to 
liability for fraud or bad-faith tort unless the fraud is perpetrated in inducing a party 
to enter a contract); Recycleworlds Consulting Corp. v. Wis. Bell, 592 N.W.2d 637, 
643 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to permit punitive damages or tortious breach of 
contract where the underlying cause of action is breach of contract). 
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pockets and can afford it.220  In addition, any plaintiff verdict could 
lead to negative press, which could cause existing policyholders to 
change insurers or could deter future customers.  A particularly high 
damage award could also provide harmful precedential value and 
inflate other award amounts.  For these reasons, insurers are poised 
to settle claims they reasonably believe they will lose, as well as some 
they believe they should win.  Settlement simply becomes the better 
option.221 
The high degree of caution insurers exercise before turning to 
litigation as a last resort is both reasonable and in the insurer’s self-
interest.  Quite simply, there is no rational incentive for the insurer to 
“low-ball” a final settlement offer and then proceed with litigation it 
believes it will lose.  Yet claims settlement statutes do not consider 
these practical mechanics, nor do they search out intentional and 
reckless behavior.222  They look only to the magnitude of difference 
between settlement and verdict. 
A reality of any civil justice system is that juries may return 
disproportionate awards.223  Also, the insurer’s internal calculation of 
the merits and costs associated with a case may be flawed as they are 
based on imperfect information.  Indeed, critical questions like the 
permissible limits of punitive damages awards are still being fleshed 
out.224  The result is that an insurer may be confronted with a higher 
verdict than it reasonably, and presumably in good faith (if acting in 
its own self-interest), anticipated.  The difference between the final 
settlement offer and the verdict is then expected to be substantial in 
amount.  This outcome is predetermined by the insurer’s initial 
decision to litigate, and it is this outcome that provides the frequency 
                                                          
 220. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that because corporations represent large 
accumulations of wealth, juries may be more inclined to award large judgments to 
what they perceive as “needier plaintiffs”). 
 221. See Barker, supra note 214, at 49 (noting that insurers may settle in an attempt 
to avoid sympathetic juries that may award inflated damages). 
 222. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (imposing a duty on 
insurers to submit a written offer of settlement or rejection within ninety days of 
receipt of proof of loss without exception).   
 223. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) (reasoning that 
the core problem with punitive damages awards is not frequent, excessive awards, but 
rather the unpredictability with which they are awarded).     
 224. See id. at 2633 (determining that a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages provided the appropriate limit under admiralty common law 
for the environmental damages caused by an oil tanker spill); Phillip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (holding that a multi-million dollar punitive 
damages award against a cigarette manufacturer violated procedural due process); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (holding that a 
$145 million punitive damages award based on $1 million in compensatory damages 
resulting from insurance bad faith exceeded due process boundaries).     
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or pattern of substantially disparate amounts necessary to maintain 
the statutory action.  Taking this to its logical conclusion, the insurer, 
to avoid a statutory action for offering “substantially less than the 
amounts ultimately recovered,” should never choose to litigate a 
claim—an unrealistic and untenable argument that would supersede 
the basic objective of protecting against fraud and overpayment in 
insurance claims-handling.225 
Comparing the final settlement offer to the amount recovered is 
also unsound policy because it amounts to an additional level of 
punishment where the insurer has previously been punished.  For the 
difference between an insurer’s final settlement offer and verdict to 
rise to an amount characterized as “substantial,” it can be assumed 
that the insurer paid some level of extra-contractual damages.   
As addressed earlier with regard to the potential for double 
punishment in bad-faith actions, tort liability, punitive damages, and 
regulatory penalties can operate to inflict multiple levels of damages 
beyond the policy limit of the insurance contract.226  Permitting 
additional tort liability, including the possibility of a second punitive 
damages award, where the basis for that recovery is in part due to the 
high magnitude of the original award, is excessive.  It is also wholly 
unjustified where the insurer’s incentive to act reasonably is already 
aligned with its self-interest.  
Courts interpreting these statutory bad-faith provisions have 
reasonable options to mitigate injustices, while holding true to the 
letter of these laws.  First, courts can limit excessive extra-contractual 
awards, like punitive damages, to indirectly lessen substantial 
differences between settlement and verdict.  For instance, in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker,227 the Supreme Court recently recognized, under 
admiralty law, a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages as the permissible limit for a compensatory 
award.228  Second, courts could more directly identify unreasonable 
insurer conduct by interpreting the “amounts ultimately recovered” 
as those compensatory amounts recovered, and by using that 
                                                          
 225. A stronger public policy argument for the comparison between a settlement 
offer and a final award exists where the insurer’s final settlement offer is less than the 
policy limit and will require the insured to pay out-of-pocket expenses.  However, the 
law already finds this practice to be a form of bad faith.  See supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text (discussing extra-contractual duties to settle third-party claims 
including situations where an insurer refused to defend the claim within the 
insured’s policy limits). 
 226. See supra Part II.A.2 (arguing that courts should refrain from permitting bad-
faith actions because it leads to duplicative penalties). 
 227. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 228. Id. at 2633. 
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interpretation as the basis for comparison.  This provides a more 
objective measure of the reasonableness of a final settlement offer 
and avoids less-defined damages standards and determinations that 
may be rooted more in bias against insurers than in fact.  Insurers can 
reasonably and in good faith miscalculate a case, and it is up to courts 
to protect and not penalize this possibility. 
5. Principles for the statutory recovery of attorneys’ fees in bad-faith actions  
The final subject in this analysis on the law of bad faith concerns 
provisions for attorneys’ fees.  A number of states have found 
exceptions to the so-called “American Rule,”229 which requires that 
each party bear the cost of its litigation, and expressly provide 
recovery for attorneys’ fees in bad-faith insurance statutes.230   
These laws typically state that the claimant may be awarded a 
“reasonable” fee amount, but they fail to address the scope of 
compensable fees.  For instance, attorneys may attempt to recover 
fees associated with recruiting other plaintiffs to join a bad-faith 
lawsuit, fees for time spent developing bad-faith arguments that will 
be attempted in future cases—and not in the prevailing plaintiffs’ 
individual case—or more commonly, fees for their prosecution of the 
contract-coverage dispute generally rather than the purported bad 
faith. 
                                                          
 229. See, e.g., Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 774 (Mont. 1992) (stating 
that absent statutory or contractual provision, attorneys’ fees will be limited to 
situations where a party has been forced into a frivolous lawsuit and must incur the 
fees to dismiss the claim); Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 
180 (Okla. 2000) (creating exceptions to the American Rule where an opponent in 
litigation has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons). 
 230. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(A) (West 2001) (awarding 
attorneys’ fees to a defendant where the settlement offer is greater than the verdict); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1839(4) (2002) (where the suit has been pursued or defended 
frivolously); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2436 (West 2000) (“reasonable” attorneys’ 
fees provision if overdue benefits are recovered in an action against the insurer); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3629 (West 1999) (providing attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 58-12-3 (West 2004) (prevailing insured is entitled to fees if it establishes that 
insurer’s refusal to pay or defend is “vexatious or without reasonable cause”);  
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209(A).  Similarly, states such as Colorado and Ohio rely on 
more general statutes to permit the award of attorneys’ fees for bad faith.   
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-101 (2008) (allowing attorneys’ fees to address the 
problem of excessive litigation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.16 (LexisNexis 2005) 
(granting attorneys’ fees on equitable principles in claims for declaratory relief).   
A number of states have also recognized the need to protect a claimant’s ability to 
challenge the allegedly wrongful acts of insurers, and permit recovery for attorneys’ 
fees under common law.  See ACMAT Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 
697, 705 (Conn. 2007) (observing that nine states (Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin) have created 
common-law exceptions where the litigation is the result of the bad faith of the 
insurer). 
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Recovery of attorneys’ fees is inappropriate in these cases because 
the fees are not directly associated with the claimant’s bad-faith suit.231  
In the absence of practical guidelines, insurers run the risk of over-
compensating claimants’ attorneys.  Thus, as a general principle, 
courts should limit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to those fees 
associated with the demonstrated statutory violation from which the 
plaintiff prevails. 
Such fairness in litigation can be achieved through relatively 
unobtrusive means.  A court could require a sworn statement by the 
attorney separating the fees spent on the claimant’s bad-faith claim 
from those spent on attenuated matters, or, at least, require a good-
faith estimate of the bad-faith fee allocation if specific records are 
unavailable.  Courts might also require that bad-faith claimants keep 
records in order to ensure a just accounting of fee awards.   
In states like Illinois, the legislature has indirectly safeguarded 
against over-compensation for attorneys’ fees recovery by limiting the 
total fee award to the greater of sixty percent of the jury’s award or 
$60,000.232  However, as another general principle, courts should base 
an award of attorneys’ fees not on what a jury returns, but rather on 
the final judgment of the court.233  This is especially important in 
contingency fee agreements—which are common in bad-faith 
litigation—because basing the fee on the final judgment protects 
against the consequences that follow when a percentage fee award is 
based on a verdict amount that is subsequently held to be excessive. 
Minnesota’s newly enacted statute governing attorneys’ fees in 
insurance bad-faith cases provides a good example of a carefully 
constructed law.  The law limits the fee award to “reasonable attorney 
fees actually incurred to establish the insurer’s [bad-faith] violation” 
and states that the fees “may be awarded only if the fees sought are 
separately accounted for by the insured’s attorney and are not 
duplicative of the fees for the insured’s attorney otherwise expended 
in pursuit of proceeds for the insured under the insurance policy.”234  
The statute further caps the maximum fee award at $100,000.235   
                                                          
 231. See Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 981 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Okla. 1999) 
(interpreting the scope of the state’s general attorney’s fees statute in a bad-faith 
insurance action to award fees on the recovery of the insured’s loss and not on the 
theory of liability).  
 232. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/155(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 233. See, e.g., Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2000) (holding 
that bad-faith claims do not accrue prior to the approval of settlement); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Sutton, 707 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring that any 
attorneys’ fees award be based on the court’s final judgment). 
 234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.18(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008).  
 235. Id.  
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The insurer is, therefore, still penalized for its bad-faith violation, but 
that additional penalty is directly related to the specific offense and is 
limited to protect against inappropriate or excessive fee awards. 
The decision to break from traditional rules and to award 
attorneys’ fees in insurance bad-faith cases is one appropriately left to 
state legislatures.236  Where the insured’s payment of attorneys’ fees is 
out-of-pocket, the circumstances appear most compelling in favor of 
fee shifting; however, the prevalence and availability of contingency 
fee arrangements in which the insured is not required to front 
monies to maintain a claim may effectively remove this barrier to sue.  
Yet, regardless of the fee arrangement or public policy rationales, 
courts, by more precisely defining the scope of fair compensation for 
attorneys, can improve the efficiency and justice in the civil system. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS MORE PRINCIPLED APPLICATION  
OF BAD-FAITH LAWS 
Expansion of bad faith has, contrary to the assertions of some legal 
experts over a decade ago,237 not reached “maturity.”  Multi-million 
dollar extra-contractual awards for bad faith are increasingly 
commonplace,238 and the state of the law reveals inconsistencies in 
structure, standards, and application,239 many of which have been 
aggressively targeted or manipulated to the detriment of insurers.240  
                                                          
 236. Commentators have identified four areas where legislatures and courts have 
found an exception to the American Rule:  (1) where the losing party has acted in 
bad faith; (2) where the litigation results in the creation or enhancement of a 
common fund from which attorneys’ fees can be paid; (3) where the litigation 
provides a “substantial benefit” to a certain class of people; and (4) where the litigant 
has served as a “private attorney general” in righting some constitutional or statutory 
wrong.  See generally Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 820–22 (Wash. 1984)  
(en banc) (listing four recognized grounds for an exception to the general rule:  bad 
faith, common fund, protection of constitutional principles, and private attorney 
general); Karla H. Alderman, Making Sense of Oregon’s Equitable Exception to the 
American Rule of Attorneys’ Fees After Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 
417–18 (1999) (referencing bad faith, common fund, substantial benefit, and private 
attorney general as four exceptions to the American Rule); John F. Vargo,  
The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:  The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (1993) (discussing exceptions to the American Rule, including 
common fund, substantial benefit, and bad faith).  
 237. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for 
Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1994) (arguing that a reduction in bad-faith 
lawsuits has resulted in a lessened threat to insurers as well as a lessened incentive to 
plaintiffs who bring bad-faith lawsuits). 
 238. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting recent trends pointing to an 
increase in bad-faith litigation). 
 239. See supra Part I (observing that while there are often substantial similarities in 
bad-faith statutes, there is inconsistency in judicial interpretation of these statutes). 
 240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (comparing the gap in 
interpretation between the legislature and courts of Colorado). 
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While the overriding purpose of bad-faith laws is to safeguard the 
interests of claimants—an assuredly valid and worthwhile objective—
the law in certain instances has gone too far and has deviated from 
the goal of bad-faith claims.  Insurers can be punished for reasonable 
actions even where the law purports to require a culpable offense.241  
Similarly, any insurer mistake, reasonable or unreasonable, may be 
punished severely regardless of whether there was an actual intent to 
engage in bad faith.  As a basic matter of fairness and justice, this 
result is unacceptable. 
The principles outlined in this Article seek to redress areas of 
abuse and restore a much needed sense of balance in the law of bad 
faith.  At the same time, these principles seek to provide greater 
substance and form to the meaning of bad faith, and enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the insurance claims-processing system.  
Establishing a more just system of compensation and curbing the flow 
of improper claims reduces the costs of insurance.  This benefits the 
overwhelming majority of insureds and also permits the entry of new 
consumers into the insurance market who were previously priced out.  
In comparison, allowing bad-faith litigation to continue to expand to 
less culpable insurer practices provides only a small fraction of 
claimants with a windfall recovery.  Tort litigation is a costly and 
imprecise enforcement tool useful only in limited instances where an 
insurer willfully schemes to deny compensation to a claimant or to 
intentionally delay payment.  It is rendered even less necessary where, 
as in the practice of insurance, other market forces exist to provide 
substantial disincentives for acting in bad faith.   
A. Market Forces Demand That Insurers Self-Regulate 
By any account, the insurance industry is massive in scale.  In 2008 
alone, insurers collected over $4 trillion in premiums globally.242  
With such an incredible potential market, it is not surprising that the 
industry is extremely competitive.  National insurers such as Geico, 
Progressive, Allstate, and State Farm each spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars every year advertising directly to consumers.243  Often, the 
                                                          
 241. See supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing excessive penalties, the 
one-sidedness of bad-faith litigation, and the dangers of finding liability where there 
is none). 
 242. Insurance Information Institute, International Insurance Fact Book, 
http://www.iii.org/international/overview/ (last visited July 27, 2009). 
 243. See Lavonne Kuykendall, Geico Advertising Spending Tops Among Auto Insurers in 
‘06, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://insurance 
headlines.com/Auto-Insurance/3882.html (listing the auto-insurance advertising 
expenditures of the top four national insurers and estimating that auto-insurance 
advertising alone would exceed $1.7 billion for 2007). 
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goal of these advertisements is not to solicit new, uninsured 
customers, but rather to convince another insurer’s customers to 
switch providers.  Smaller, local insurers also have a role in this 
heavily fragmented industry, finding more niche areas of property 
coverage or even competing with national insurers on price.  In such 
a highly competitive environment, and given the standard function of 
insurance, the two primary means of differentiation for an insurer are 
price and quality of service.  
For insureds, this high level of competition represents a much 
improved bargaining position.  Out of necessity, insurers now cannot 
afford to engage in any action that could be construed as bad faith.  
This result is independent of tort liability or the threat of tort 
litigation.  Included in the insurer’s quality of service is its reputation, 
and consumers are unlikely to continue purchasing insurance from 
an insurer who they, by word of mouth or through other channels, 
perceive to be dishonest or unreputable.  With many available 
alternatives at their fingertips, insureds can easily, and at nominal 
cost, change insurers within minutes in many instances.244  The fact 
that consumers have this degree of bargaining power to enter and 
exit insurance transactions also undercuts the basic public policy 
argument favoring recognition of tort liability that insurance, by its 
nature, places the insured in a position of unequal bargaining.245 
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from market competition, 
independent of existing governmental regulation, is that insurers 
must self-regulate their own conduct to survive.  As briefly addressed 
earlier with regard to comparisons of final settlement offers to 
amounts ultimately recovered in bad-faith lawsuits, it is not in the 
                                                          
 244. See, e.g., Geico Insurance, www.geico.com (last visited June 28, 2009) 
(advertising that fifteen minutes can save fifteen percent or more on car insurance). 
 245. See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167  
(Tex. 1987) (arguing that insurance contracts are unique because of inherently 
unequal bargaining power between the insurer and insured, and thus bad-faith 
actions should be maintained to prevent insurers from arbitrarily denying coverage 
or forcing insureds to prematurely settle their claims); see also United Fire & Cas. Co. 
v. Boulder Plaza Residential, L.L.C., No. 06-cv-00037-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 2078114, at 
*5 (D. Colo. May 13, 2008) (stating that courts construe ambiguous provisions 
against the insurer and in favor of providing coverage because of the unique nature 
of insurance); Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 681–82  
(Cal. 1969) (finding that the quasi-public nature of insurance forces courts to look 
beyond the rules of private contracts negotiated by parties of relatively equal 
bargaining strength); Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 802 
(Minn. 2004) (referring to insurance as “quasi-public” and that it should be within a 
state’s police power to regulate); Wathor v. Mut. Assurance Adm’rs, Inc., 87 P.3d 559, 
562 (Okla. 2004) (arguing that the quasi-public relationship creates a nondelegable 
duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the insurer). 
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financial self-interest of insurers to engage in bad faith.246  The 
benefits of intentionally delaying or denying a claim do not outweigh 
the risk that even one of those cases will result in full contract 
damages, extra-contractual damages, punitive damages, state 
regulatory fines, attorneys’ fees, and future compliance costs.   
Paradoxically, these incentives have not reduced bad-faith 
litigation.  Quite the contrary has occurred.247  This increase in the 
number and size of claims suggests that insurers are either brazenly 
ignoring and flouting the law of bad faith, which is clearly against 
their rational self-interest, or, more realistically, that the law is 
inappropriately and increasingly punishing insurers for unintentional 
acts, such as reasonable denials of claims, mistakes, or other minor 
violations.  The market of insurance already provides a sizeable 
reward for those insurers who can best minimize mistakes, avoid bad-
faith lawsuits, and offer superior service.  The penalty for an insurer’s 
failure to do so is forcible exit from the market.  The market system, 
along with the additional level of protection provided by state 
regulatory enforcement, can and should be relied upon to fairly 
protect claimants.  Litigation as a means to safeguard claimants 
should become increasingly irrelevant.   
B. Implications of Permitting Improper Bad-Faith Claims 
Proponents of expanding private enforcement of bad-faith law 
through greater statutory enumeration of alleged types of bad faith, 
heightened penalties, or lower standards to maintain a claim, 
routinely justify this advocacy on the grounds that any change in the 
law will only impact “bad” insurers.  A parallel situation would be that 
increased health code standards only impact poorly managed 
restaurants.  The fallacy in this argument is that when expanding the 
law to include less culpable offenses, the law will eventually implicate 
every insurer’s actions, good or bad.  Premiums will rise.  
Policyholders will suffer the costs. 
When the law begins to punish insurer’s unintentional acts, the 
foundations of the insurance system break down and the incentive 
structures change.  Quick settlements at higher, even unjustified 
prices become encouraged so that insurers can avoid lawsuits.   
Also, financial incentives and rewards for insurers that provide 
superior services are diminished if the market effectively punishes 
                                                          
 246. See supra Part II.B.4 (observing that the fears and costs of litigation often 
force insurers to prematurely settle claims that may be invalid). 
 247. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting recent trends pointing to an 
increase in bad-faith litigation). 
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insurers when they are trying to be good.  The insurance industry’s 
best providers are inappropriately placed on equal or comparable 
footing with insurers that would ordinarily be expelled from the 
industry due to market forces. 
Moreover, a lack of rational boundaries in bad-faith law harms all 
consumers.  Permitting extra-contractual damages awards in cases 
that should not appropriately be settled does not serve a useful 
purpose.  It provides a windfall recovery to claimants based on events 
such as human error or reasonable miscalculation, and appeals to the 
biases that juries maintain against insurers.  In the end, the insurance 
consumer pays these superfluous costs.  Insurers internalize the 
systemic risks of bad-faith litigation and raise premiums accordingly.  
Because this happens, in part, on an industry-wide level, the increase 
in cost occurs independent of a specific insurer’s risks of bad-faith 
litigation and does not distinguish the truly “bad” insurers from those 
who are trying, admittedly without perfection, to be responsible.   
Increases in insurance costs, in turn, contribute to a range of 
societal problems.  Presently in the United States, high insurance 
premiums price large populations out of the market.  Forty-five 
million Americans, or one out of every seven persons, do not have 
health insurance.248  There are also millions of uninsured or 
underinsured motorists driving in the streets;249 these persons are left 
wholly unprotected in the event of an accident, and the costs of 
coverage for insured motorists increase as a result.  For example, in 
Texas alone, there are an estimated three to four million uninsured 
motorists out of the state’s sixteen million drivers.250  As a policy 
tradeoff, the benefits of placing rational limits on bad-faith lawsuits 
and reducing system costs far outweigh the costs of additional 
compensation to individual claimants for less culpable insurer acts.  
This is because the state insurance department already imposes a 
penalty on these acts, and because private claims may be addressed 
through traditional contract theory. 
                                                          
 248. Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Census Bureau Revises 2004 and 
2005 Health Insurance Coverage Estimates (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http:// 
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/health_care_insurance/ 
009789.html. 
 249. Cf. Road Hazard:  Uninsured Driver Rates Climb, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 10, 
2009, available at http://www.insuranceheadlines.com/Auto-Insurance/5595.html 
(reporting an estimated increase of three million more uninsured drivers in the last 
five years).  
 250. Terrence Stutz, 3 Years After Law, Texas Will Target Uninsured Drivers, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, May 8, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent 
/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/050808dntexuninsured.dbf3df87.html. 
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As proposed throughout this Article, the most efficient 
enforcement system for insurance bad faith is to allow private lawsuits 
where claimants can prove an intentional or reckless act on the part 
of the insurer.  In any other violation arising under a claims 
settlement statute, the state’s insurance regulatory authority should 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction.  This clearer structure would prevent 
dual-enforcement and double-punishment against insurers, while still 
adequately safeguarding the interests of claimants and consumers at 
large.  It would also sustain the heavy market competition that 
improves consumers’ bargaining power and necessitates self-
regulation by insurers. 
If bad-faith law continues on its present course, the implications 
are adverse to all parties’ interests.  Responsible and ethical insurers 
will find it harder to differentiate from one another and compete, 
claimants will be more susceptible to dishonest acts, and the system 
costs will continue to increase, harming all consumers.   
Also troubling, consumers may perceive an insurer’s inundation of 
bad-faith claims and resulting high verdicts as an ordinary industry 
practice.  They may become apathetic to an insurer’s service 
reputations, severely inhibiting the market system’s repudiation of 
bad insurers, and they may differentiate insurers only with regard to 
price.  Worse, consumers might begin to tolerate bad faith as 
inherent to the insurance business, perpetuating the flow of 
improper litigation and exacerbating biases against insurers.   
CONCLUSION 
The law of bad faith has witnessed an extraordinary, 
unprecedented development in the past three decades.251  What 
began as a court’s novel attempt to level the playing field in insurance 
claims-handling is now enshrined in the common law or legislative 
code of every state.  The speed at which this law became so firmly 
rooted, however, left important issues outstanding.  Before the 
common law evolved to address and refine this newly independent 
and amorphous tort concept of bad faith, claims settlement statutes 
were enacted across the country.  The result was greater inconsistency 
and uncertainty in the law, which was then magnified by courts’ 
widely varying statutory interpretations.  The law that sought to 
balance the insurance equation suddenly became unbalanced. 
                                                          
 251. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that the development of bad-faith 
law is noteworthy because courts have only recognized three or four new torts in the 
past century). 
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Caught on the unenviable side of the scale were insurers.   
While the new laws operated to punish bad acts, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
gradually recognized that less reprehensible acts, even reasonable 
acts, were fair game in some jurisdictions.  At the same time, 
remedies were expanded, and continue to expand today as many 
states reexamine their bad-faith statutes.  The law thus shows little 
evidence that bad-faith litigation has leveled off or reached maturity.  
Rational boundary lines must be drawn, and the responsibility falls on 
both state legislatures and state courts. 
